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Cinema, one of the most popular instruments of mass media,
is also a product of the society and it cannot be thought
to be independent from the social history. Beynelmilel
(Sırrı Süreyya Önder, 2006) and Babam ve Oğlum (Çağan
Irmak, 2005), being popular Turkish films can be put and
analyzed under the category of 12 September films and
trauma films. The characters in both films bear the
features of traumatic personalities produced by the 12
September 1980 military coup and its aftermath in Turkish
society. The two films create a cinematic field to discuss
the 12 September trauma and its impacts. Beynelmilel and
Babam ve Oğlum should therefore be paid attention and
analyzed, as popular products of the society.
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Kitle iletişim araçları içinde en popüler olanlardan sinema
toplumsal bir üründür ve sosyal tarihten bağımsız olarak
düşünülemez. Beynelmilel (Sırrı Süreyya Önder, 2006) ve
Babam ve Oğlum (Çağan Irmak, 2005), popüler filmler olarak,
12 Eylül filmleri ve travma sineması kategorilerinde
incelenebilirler. Her iki filmdeki karakterler de 12 Eylül
1980 askeri darbesinin ve sonrasında gelen sonuçların Türk
toplumunda doğurduğu travmanın izlerini taşımakta ve
kişiliklerine yansıtmakta ve 12 Eylül travmasının ve
etkilerinin tartışılması için sinematik bir alan
yaratmaktadır. Bu yüzdendir ki, bu travmayı hatırlama ve
tartışma şansı kaçırılmamalı ve Beynelmilel ile Babam ve
Oğlum filmleri, toplumun ürettiği popüler ürünler olarak
incelenmedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: 12 Eylül filmleri, Travma, Travma
Sineması, Sosyal Farkındalık, Geçmişle Yüzleşme/ Hesaplaşma
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Throughout this thesis, I intend to deal with the 12
September Turkish military coup as a turning point in
Turkish history, which is a traumatic event that has been
influencing the social life together with the culture as
well as having influences and impacts on the political
and economic aspects of life. The films Beynelmilel
(Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Muharrem Gülmez 2006) and Babam
ve Oğlum (Çağan Irmak 2005) are to be investigated
throughout the research in order to see to what extent
this event has reflections on these two films and if
there are any, to look into and analyze those reflections
of this critical event on the films.
Holding the belief that 12 September is a traumatic event
in the Turkish history that has been creating individual
traumas, which later pile up and form a trauma on the
2social level; all in all a traumatic society, the two
films will be analyzed under the category of trauma
cinema owing to the films’ and the experiences of the
main characters’ compliance with the definition of the
concept of trauma. The 12 September military coup in 1980
has been a traumatic socio-political event in Turkish
history owing to the fact that the event and its
aftermath brought along and spread fear and vulnerability
within the society and caused people to lose hope and
sight of the future by leaving no room for security and
trust. The main characters in the films (Gülendam and
Sadık and also their families) are victims of the 12
September military coup, who bear the characteristics of
traumatic, muted and fragmented individuals, who have
lost their beloved persons as a result of the event.
It is a common belief and opinion of many film critiques
and film scholars that Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum do
not really serve the purpose of reflecting the absolute
trauma within the Turkish society. This assumption is
true to a certain extent and it could be argued that it
occurs as a result of the films’ too much focus on
individual and familial traumatic experiences and the way
they cope with them rather than dealing with the question
of the 12 September for serving such purposes as judging
the real reasons behind the event, criticizing the
3perpetrators of it and analyzing objectively the victims
who suffered from the event...etc.
However, the fact can be by no means ignored that this
ingrained approach of “not being able to analyze and cope
with the 12 September socio-political event and its
consequences” is not specific to films but, this approach
has been confirmed for a long time by the very society
itself. Until the traumatic event has been recognized by
the society, the experiences will always stay at the
individual level. Therefore, it would not be wrong to
argue that it is unexceptional that the films, produced
by film-makers within the society, also deal with the 12
September event on the individual level, telling
audiences about individual stories. Yet, the contribution
endeavors of the films into the discussion of this
traumatic event through keeping the matter alive should
not be completely ignored. From 1984 till 2009, 36 films
have been confirmed to have been made which could be put
under the title of 12 September films1. The two films
Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum have been chosen to be
analyzed in this research, because these films were made
after the year 2000, and could be argued to have been the
most popular films that could be analyzed under the
1
 The list of 12 September films confirmed is available in the
Appendix.
4category of 12 September films. In spite of the fact that
the film Beynelmilel has been received better critiques
than Babam ve Oğlum, thanks to its humorous critique of
the military logic; thus the 12 September event, the two
films resemble each other through carrying certain
features of the genre melodrama. Both films provide and
represent examples, particularly with their main
characters, for the analysis of trauma cinema; however,
both films get caught in the trap of the difficult of
trauma representation, which is itself a very problematic
issue, as it will be analyzed and expanded below with
concrete examples.
The films Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum should at least
be appreciated owing to the fact that they create a
cinematic field to represent the internalized
societal/collective traumas. As also underlined by Nilgün
Abisel (1995) popular genre films cannot be discussed
being independent from the social history. Therefore,
popular genre films deserve a closer attention and
analysis. (Abisel, 1995, p. 31)
51. AN OVERVİEW ON 12 SEPTEMBER
1.1. The Disposition of the 12 September Military Coup
in Turkish History
It could be claimed that the 12 September 1980 Turkish
military coup has been a great turning point in the
history of Turkish Republic. The 12 September military
coup is critically important not only because of the
individual, social and/or political events that were
actually experienced at the time, but also because of the
fact that the military coup of the 1980 is regarded as a
signal that declared the characteristics of the period
that came after the 1980s. The military’s overthrowing
the existing government and its expropriation of the
Turkish political life is considered to be a dark era in
which serious violation of democracy was experienced,
6which led to even more austere damages to the Turkish
social political life by helping the anti-democratic
attitudes of institutions and structurings to become more
and more established and rooted. Murat Belge (1993)
defines the September 12 military takeover and the period
came after it as “the heaviest general coercion and
oppression system experienced by the society since 1950,
the closing of the single-party era, including the former
military intervention phases” (p. 9). Belge goes on
explaining why he considers the 12 September to be the
heaviest oppression system in Turkish history since 1950
in the following passage:
All ‘authoritarian’ states require primarily a
‘submissive’ society and public. The 12 September did
its utmost to provide that in Turkey. It directly
physically exterminated and eliminated the people who
were resisting not to become ‘submissive…’ Moreover,
with the measures and policies it took in the
education system and in the operating of the
ideological channels within the society, it did its
best to quell the free and genuine thought. Briefly,
the 12 September event attempted to make a herd out
of the Turkish society by eliminating individualism
(Belge, 1993, p. 10)2.
2 For further information please see:
Kongar, E. (1993). 12 Eylül kültürü(12 September Culture).
İstanbul: Remzi.
Birand, M. A. (1999). 12 Eylül. Türkiye’nin miladı(12 September:
The milestone of Turkey). İstanbul : Doğan Kitapçılık
Evin, A. (1988). The State and democracy: Changing patterns
of cleavages before and after 1980. In M. Heper & A. Evin
(Eds.), State, democracy and the military: Turkey in the 1980s
(pp. 201-213). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
71.2. Could Cinema Function as Memory Banks of the
Society?
1.2.1. Cinema: Reproducible and Recollectible Art Works
As it is a well-known fact, the main heritage of the
Western aesthetics, basing its arguments on Aristotle’s
Poetics (335 BC) embraces the vision that art simply
duplicates/reproduces nature. All the branches of the
established arts adopted this view from the early
Renaissance to the late 19th century and achieved great
success with the pursuit of this ideal.
From Giotto to Monet and the Impressionists… later
the novels of Balzac and Tolstoy achieved a more
accurate representation of nature and society than
anything literature had previously known, and the
plays of Ibsen and Chekhov seemed to carry Hamlet’s
ideal of the theater to its limit (Mast & Cohen,
1985, p. 1).
However, an earthquake was experienced in the fields of
arts together with the invention of photography for the
camera had a more different way of representing the
nature than it was previously known. It is beyond doubt
that the phenomenon of media, and cinema in particular,
were amongst the most significant attributions of the
20th century that we outpaced not so long ago. It could
8be argued that many people have crowded film theatres all
over the world and have seen many films in their leisure
time, since the first public screening was done in 1895
in Paris (Monaco, 2000, p. 15).
Cinema could be qualified as the seventh art –in this
context, the word art deriving its semantic roots from
the seventeenth century when the definition of the word
was being straitened from being a master on a specific
field to the artistic activities such as painting,
sculpture, drawing, architecture… and anything that found
an acceptance in the field of Fine Arts. Though one must
also admit the fact that such a traditional use of the
word, as also emphasized by Siegfried Kracauer (1985
[1960]), is misleading, and it leads to a terminological
quandary, because it invigorates the common belief that a
piece of work is only considered to be an art piece on
condition that it ignores the recording obligations of
the cinema medium with the aim of reaching aesthetic
beauty by using strong formative elements, and therefore
not paying enough attention to the concerns of camera-
reality (p. 19). Kracauer stated his strict opinion on
the issue by the following:
If film is an art at all, it certainly should not be
confused with the established arts. There may be some
justification in loosely applying this fragile
concept to such films as Nanook or Paisan, or
Potemkin which are deeply steeped in camera-life. But
9in defining film as art, it must always be kept in
mind that even the most creative film maker is much
less independent of nature in the raw than the
painter or the poet; that his creativity manifests
itself in letting nature in and penetrating it
(Kracauer, 1985 [1960], p. 20).
As James Monaco (2000) also discussed, in the early times
there was just one way to produce art, and that was the
“present time/real time;” meaning singers would sing,
story-tellers would tell their stories; actors and
actresses performed their roles in dramas (p. 27-32).
It could be argued that the big progress in the
communication methods came right after the invention of
the scripture and then the developing of the pictorial
writing owing to the fact that the images had now become
preservable. The stories of story-tellers were not flying
in the air any more, but they had now become
recollectible and reproducible. In this way, the 7000
year history of arts based on literary or pictorial
elements, in other words, the representative media, came
to the end of its golden time and gave way to the
recording media whose development is as fundamental as
the invention of the writing 7000 years ago, because
undoubtedly “photograph, film and/or sound recording has
remarkably changed our historical perspective” (Monaco,
2000, p. 30).
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To go back to the topic of cinema qualified as the 7th
art; to use Monaco’s terminology, “cinema is a branch of
the recording arts that purveys a direct way between the
observer/audience and the topic and that has its own
codes” (Monaco, 2000, p. 31). It could be argued that
this characteristic of cinema being able to build up a
direct relationship between the observer and the subject
matter has been the most controversial issue when one
considers the whole issue of film-making. As Monaco also
highlighted, the recording arts, in this very context it
is the cinema, have their own codes and traditions;
however a film or a sound recording is not the very
authentic veracity itself. Furthermore, it has always
been open to new developments that would bring the art of
cinema supposedly closer and closer to the reality
itself, such as the color film being closer to the real
world than the black and white film, and sound films
similarly having more common with the authentic world
than the silent film would have (Monaco, 2000, pp. 30-
31).
In accordance with these changes and improvements in the
field of arts, questions and discussions picked up the
speed and have been escalating since then concerning the
concepts and topics of reality, formative impulses and
the imitation of nature. These concepts keep on creating
11
their own questions and debates to this day: Is the aim
of an art work to simply and only copy the nature/the
world, or should an art work add a special view to the
world and should it offer the audience interpretations of
the world? It seems that there is no single answer to the
mentioned questions, and each piece of art work,
especially films, should be evaluated by considering its
own characteristics and also in comparison to the other
works. Yet, there is one thing for certain; and that is
these shift of paradigms have been changing the
historical perception, through which individuals and
societies perceive and understand the world. The films as
the main focus of this thesis are also elements of
debates and discussions, since in this age they occupy a
very significant place in the lives of the people,
considering the mutual time/effort-sparing of film makers
and the audience.
1.2.2. Cinema: A Popular Cultural Force
Together with the individual stories and matters, the
cinema also represents the changes, shifts, tensions and
unrests that are gone through by the society. In other
words, in this context, the cinema may be thought to be
12
functioning as the mirror of the society. For Bazin, film
history, criticism and theory (the three being, his view,
inseparable) were meant to contribute, above all, to the
establishment of an enlightened, discriminating public.
By setting its standards high enough, this public could
then gain some measure of control over what has become
the most powerful of popular cultural forces (Turk, 1979,
p. 653).
The cinema is a social phenomenon that bears much more
different meanings than only being art, and at the same
time it is a product of mass culture. Discussions have
always been made whether or not cinema could function as
memory banks of the society by reflecting the period in
which they were produced. Some even support the belief
that cinema is a great help for strengthening the social
memory.
In her article published in the magazine Cinemascope,
Nazmiye Karadağ (2007) stated that “the most important
artistic weapon of invigorating the social memory and
historicizing the very moment we are experiencing is the
cinema” (p. 52). It is possible to associate Karadağ’s
view to Bazin, who supported the idea that the witnessed
images show audiences not only the features of
objects/phenomena but also the very existence of those
13
objects/phenomena, and that it offers audiences what has
not been recognized before and represents its permanency
(Büker, 1989, p. 20). In this way, it becomes easier to
imagine how cinema could contribute into social memory.
It could be shortly noted that in this sense “cinema
presents spectators information on objective actuality,
which one cannot perceive with one’s senses“ (Büker,
1989, p. 20).
Although this may yet sound too reductionist an approach,
still cinema is the most popular instrument among all the
means of mass communication, and it could influence
people’s historical perspective. Therefore, films, the
so-called the 12 September Turkish films3 in particular,
should be paid more attention and be analyzed in terms of
the themes, characters created in films, places used as
settings in order to see how that period has been
reflected in them and in which context and with what kind
of direct and/or indirect messages they reach audiences.
3
 A group of films made after 12 September military coup in 1980,
which thematizes or deals with the event in any possible way and
reflects torture, has been identified as “12 September films” in
Turkish cinema (Maktav, 2002, p. 226).
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2. 12 SEPTEMBER MILITARY COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH
2.1. The Socio-Political Turmoil between 1975 and 1980
The 1980s military coup was meant to bring and end to the
domestic turmoil that was experienced between the years
1975 and 1980. Why was there a political instability and
social turmoil in Turkey? It could be claimed that the
industrialization period and the industrial progress that
started around the 1950s led to the desire for social,
political and psychological progress and enlightenment in
the 1960s. As also underlined by İlkay Sunar and Sabri
Sayari (1986), the impact of political parties and
society by parties was on the increase after the mid-
1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, in spite of the
rising controls on the parties after 1961. (p. 175) Sunar
and Sayari stated:
15
especially after the mid-1960s, the weakening and
disruption of ascriptive ties, the fast increasing
urbanization and growth of shanty towns, the rapid
socio-economic change, and the high level of social
mobilization- all these developments greatly
magnified the impact of parties (Sunar & Sayari,
1986, p. 175).
This situation could be interpreted as the society’s
awakening on the fact that living under better conditions
was not a dream or it was just for specific groups of
people. Because of that reason, people were in a fight so
as to increase their share of the contemporary world.
It is also possible to talk about another social event
within the society coinciding with the same time period:
While this struggle for better life conditions among the
people was going on, the revolutionist-socialist view
among the students as well as the intellectuals was
getting more and more spread (Kanbur, 2005, p. 57).  This
“unrest” within the society triggered the military to
take action in order to bring and end to this atmosphere
of political instability. The military coup of the 1971
was produced under those social and political
circumstances.
Furthermore there was a political division within the
security forces, as well. It could be argued that the
international environment of the late seventies was also
encouraging the social turmoil and political instability
16
within the country. At the time USA and Soviet Union were
getting in a big competition, and were trying to spread
their influence on the world politics. Fearing the Soviet
Union influence, it became crucially important for the
Turkish state to get more tied to the Western bloc.
However, when compared to the military coup of the 1980,
the 1971 military coup was not as harsh and dominant
(Belge, 1993, p. 9). The turmoil that made its peak
between the years 1975-1980 when people were in search of
more freedom and more social welfare, could be said to
have been ended by the 12 September military junta, by
applying violence and social suppression excessively,
meaning not allowing people to create social oppositional
power and act collectively, and resulting in the people
being interrupted in their pursuit of welfare and freedom
(Kanbur, 2005, p. 59). Metin Heper and Frank Tachau
(1983) give a view over the 1980’s crisis milieu: “The
crisis which spawned the 1980 military intervention in
Turkey was multi- faceted, including economic breakdown,
civil violence, and open challenges to such highly
symbolic values as secularist nationalism“ (p. 25).
The two chief parties of the era were the Justice Party
(Adalet Partisi; the right-wing party) and the Republican
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; the main party
17
of centre-left) (Sunar & Sayari, 1986, p. 177). The
Justice Party was being accused of flirting with the
fascistic idea by the Republican People’s Party, for
applying policies involved with “strident anti-Communism,
an appeal to religious and nationalist sentiments, and a
diffuse of sentimental populism” (Sunar & Sayari, 1986,
p. 177). Similarly, the Republican People’s Party led by
Bülent Ecevit, adopting social democracy, was being
alleged with leaning towards communism and creating
anarchistic tendencies by the JP for following policies
involving making “basic changes in Turkey’s socio-
economic order; an increasingly radical rhetoric heavily
oriented toward mass appeal to workers, small peasants,
and urban marginals” (Sunar & Sayari, 1986, p. 178).
Thus, the political fragmentation and polarization
between the two parties was at its peak (Sunar & Sayari,
1986, p. 177). As also emphasized by Sunar and Sayari
(1986) in their article where they discussed the problems
of democracy in Turkey, the rise of party fragmentation
does not necessarily result in big and destructive crisis
in democracies but, it brings along coalitionary
governments or minority part governments (p. 179).
However, Sunar and Sayari underlined the fact that
fragmentation among the parties can bear really
disastrous consequences once polarization also appears on
the stage. They noted: “…when fragmentation is
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accompanied by the simultaneous rise of polarization
among the parties, the result can be destructive; the
functioning of democratic regimes is seriously undermined
when the party system is both fragmented and polarized”
(Sunar & Sayari, 1986, p. 179).
Particularly during the 1970s, the fragmentation
accompanied by polarization was also the case in Turkey;
more clearly observed among the party elites and
activists than among the mass public (Sunar & Sayari,
1986, p. 179). Mostly, as a reflection of this political
polarization between the parties, the political fights
between the left-wing and right-wing student groups were
ascending and becoming more and more violent every day.
As the case was also stressed by George S. Harris (1988),
“After 1968, clashes between right-wing and left-wing
student turned murderous. Killings spread to labor
gatherings, and forceful disruption of extreme left and
right political party meetings became common” (p. 185).
The economic crisis which was observable in the economic
stagnation, rising inflation…etc. was also helping and
cultivating the chaotic atmosphere of the country.
Various types of acts of violence such as sabotage, bank
robberies and killings were escalating each day.
Security forces were unable to prevent these actions of
violence (Harris, 1988, p. 185). The political parties
19
were not able to find any solutions for the ongoing
chaotic and unstable political and economic atmosphere of
Turkey in those years, because they themselves were more
involved with their own interest of becoming dominant
over the other; therefore the parties could not perform
their task of protecting the interests of the whole
nation and leading he country to a more peaceful and
democratic milieu. This situation could well be
summarized by the following statement made by Kemal H.
Karpat: “In 1980 the prestige of the parties was at an
all time low due to their pitiful performance in the
years from 1960 to 1980” (Karpat, 1988, p. 152). All this
process was at a great rate preparing the anticipated
grounds for the Turkish military to intervene in politics
and to justify later its undemocratic action of takeover.
William Hale recapitulated why the military decided to
intervene in politics:
On 12 September, the army had set itself four main
tasks: firstly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, to
restore economic growth and stability; thirdly, to
introduce a new Constitution and legal arrangements
which, it was hoped, would prevent another lapse into
anarchy; and fourthly, to work out effective
arrangements with the civilian politicians, both old
and new (Hale, 1988, p. 166).
20
2.2. The Background of the 12 September Military Coup
…the Turkish nation has…always looked to the
military…as the leader of movements to achieve lofty
national ideals…When speaking of the army, I am
speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation
who are the true owners of this country…The Turkish
nation…considers its army the guardian of its ideals
(Atatürk, 1952, p. 226).
It is a well-known fact that the military in Turkey plays
a vitally important role in politics, which could be
thought to be contradicting with the principles of
liberal democracy. This military identity of Turkish
state government could even be regarded as a tradition in
the history of Turkish politics, especially when one
considers the fact that the military always occupied a
franchised space in the political system of the Ottoman-
Turkish polity. It may well be right to argue that the
mission of the military to be the agent of modernization
and patronage in Turkey was even more and more emphasized
in the Republican period owing to Atatürk, formerly a
soldier, who confided, to a large extent, in the military
power for his reforms. It is true that Atatürk first
appeared on the stage of the Turkish history as a
military leader before he turned out to be a political
leader owing to the political disposition of his actions;
however it still would not be correct to consider his
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movement purely to be a military intervention, as Metin
Heper and Frank Tachau (1983) also pointed out:
It may be a misnomer to characterize his movement as
military intervention in politics. On the other hand,
there can be no doubt that his activities were highly
political in nature and that he exploited his
military position and skills for basically political
purposes, i.e., the establishment of a new state
(Heper & Tachau, 1983, p. 19).
As it has also been underlined by Karpat, “Atatürk saw
himself as the total embodiment of the nation and, as
such, acted to secure the nation’s welfare… This
resembled the Western idea of absolutist but enlightened
government” (Karpat, 1988, p. 152). However, it should
also be noted that one of the most significant endeavors
of the Kemalist regime, particularly of Atatürk was to
keep military issues separated from the political
affairs, by convincing the parliament to outlaw military
officers to become nominees for elections before they
quit their military job4. “The aim of this policy was not
only to prevent the military from exercising direct
political influence, but also to insulate the military
establishment from the pulling and hauling of the
political arena“ (Heper & Tachau, 1983, p. 19). Yet it
could still be argued that the very belief that the
military will be the chief guardian of Atatürk’s
4
 See also Heper, M. (1984). Atatürk and the Civil Bureaucracy. In
J. M. Landau, (Ed.), Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey.
Colorado: Boulder.
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principles of republicanism, secularism, nationalism,
populism, statism and reformism on which he based on the
Republican state, still exists and  could be considered
to be a significant prove what kind of a role the
military is given in Turkey. Therefore; considering this
fact, Harris concluded that “Atatürk’s main concern with
the army was not to keep it out of politics, but to make
sure it remained completely loyal to him and to the
Republic” (Harris, 1965, p. 56). In this case it could be
stated that the Turkish military would always take an
action in the event of endangerment of either of those
principles of republicanism, and function what Heper and
Tachau defined as “guardian” and create the “guardian
regime” where “military guardians are essentially similar
to moderators except that they feel it necessary to
displace the civilian governors, that is, to overtly
assume control of government“ (1983, p. 17). Briefly, the
basic executive power of democracy is perceived in a
different way by the Turkish military than in other
countries. As also underlined by Karpat, “the presidency
is the symbol and repository of the ideals and ideologies
of the state and of the regime as a whole as these are
understood by the military (e.g., nationhood, Atatürkism,
secularism, and modernism)” (1988, p. 156).
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Then it is not so much surprising for the military and
the soldiers as the key actors, - raised and trained in
such a way that their honorable and heroic mission of
protecting and modernizing the country have been
processed in to their minds and souls - to let the
country run by the civilian control and to believe in the
principle of civilian supremacy. Instead of espousing the
core and the operating of the supreme civilian control,
the Turkish military “felt authorized to intervene in
civilian politics (issuing threats or memorandums,
blackmailing or replacing the government through
pressure, or coup d'état) when acts or decisions of the
civilian authorities seemed to threaten what they
interpreted as the national interest“ (Demirel, 2003, p.
3). The following passage taken from Tanel Demirel
(2003), a former military officer, could be claimed to be
summarizing how the military service or job is perceived
by the Turkish citizens:
The education and training of the Turkish officers
does not resemble that of other armies. In those
armies, officership is perceived as a professional
job the same as that of civil servants. For us (in
Turkey), on the other hand, it is held in high
esteem. It is not only a professional job but also a
national duty, guardianship of the state. Trained
with such beliefs in (army) schools, officers spread
these beliefs in their environment as they move up
the ranks, thus the duty to watch and to protect the
Republic becomes an entrenched belief in their whole
army career. When they deemed it necessary, to do
that job (watching and protecting the Republic),
either they spontaneously act or perform commands
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which tell them to intervene comfortably as if
performing a normal duty (Demirel, 2003, p. 4).
Although some people referred to the military
interventions as a reformist movement, the destructive
effects of such kind of a military attitude on the very
core of democracy may well be confessed5. Yet, it would
be wrong to claim that the founders of the Turkish
Republic did not favor the democratic regime, and
denigrated it outright. It is perhaps true that the
military has a positive image of the democracy and it
respects the democratic governance of the country;
however what makes the situation look contradictory and
awkward is that the military tries to watch and protect
the well being of democracy by interfering in the
civilian affairs with the short-term military regime.
The historian Feroz Ahmad (1993) states the following:
“The public, worn down by the breakdown of law and order,
the galloping inflation and shortages of basic goods, the
squabbles among the parties and the paralyzed parliament,
welcomed martial law and the promise of stability it
offered“ (Ahmad, 1993, p. 182). This “unrest” within the
society triggered the military to take action in order to
5
 For futher information see also Huntington S. (Ed.). (1962).
Changing patterns of military politics. New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe.
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bring and end to this atmosphere of political
instability. The military intervention of the 1980 was
produced and justified under those social and political
circumstances.
It could be said that the 1980s military coup was
intended to complete the job that was not finished
properly by the 1971’s military coup and it was meant to
bring and end to the social turmoil that was experienced
between the years 1975 and 19806.
The aim of the operation is to safeguard the
integrity of the country, to provide for national
unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and
the possibility of civil war and internecine
struggle, to re-establish the existence and the
authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors
that hinder the smooth working of the democratic
order (General Evren, as cited in 12 September in
Turkey: Before and After, p. 229).
In other words, considering itself as the chief guardian
of the national interests, the military undertook its
heroic special duty to intervene in the civilian affairs
so as to save the nation from the ongoing social turmoil
and political instability at the expense of the use of
extensive torture, which “never uncommon, now became
widespread and systematic, with a number of suspects and
prisoners dying in suspicious circumstances“ (Ahmad,
6See also Heper, M. (1979, Winter). Recent instability in Turkish
politics: End of a monocentrist polity? International Journal of Turkish
Studies, 1, 102-13.
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1993, p. 185). As also agreed and put in the following
sentences by Demirel,
…the military perceived itself as the ultimate
guardian of the state and national interests, there
was little, if any, discomfort for the officers in
conceiving the possibility of overthrowing the
elected government. In their well-entrenched role as
the ultimate guardian of the state, Turkish officers
regarded the idea of staging a coup, not as unlawful
and unethical, but as a special duty which they were
trained to carry out when certain conditions occurred
(Demirel, 2003, p. 6).
It could be argued, all in all, the military coup was
proven to have been necessary by the reason of the
government that was "driving 'our country into anarchy,
fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest,' with
the consequence that the future of the Turkish Republic
is ... seriously threatened...,'' (Ahmad, 1977, p. 205).
In other words, according to its implementers and
supporters, the military coup of the 1980 was implemented
for the sake of preventing fraternal fighting and in
order to re-build a peaceful and secure atmosphere in the
country (Demirer, 2005, p. 65). Briefly, the perpetrators
of the 12 September did all the implementations by the
name of Kemalism in order to modernize Turkey and adopt
the principles of the western world. However, Murat Belge
(1993) argues that the perception of the western world by
the Turkish society remained on the physical level in
following the westernizer ideologies (1993, p. 12). To
put it in simpler terms, the Turkish society, as a
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society suspending in the developing country status, got
to know the western world with its military power and war
competency, which were both consequences of the
capitalist economic structure (Belge, 1993, p. 12).
Having skipped a very significant fact; that the western
world also had a more confirmed democracy understanding
and civil structurings, Turkish authorities such as
governments and the military have always applied an
authoritarian collectivity to reach its primary goal of
becoming powerful just like the western world, which was
also the case considering the 12 September military coup
and the periods following it. That is to say, the
implementations applied in the name of Kemalism/
Aataturkism regrettably remained only on the level of the
elite, and could not involve the society. Kevin Robins
also expressed the same assumption in the following way:
Kemalism was an ideology imposed on the people from
above. Its self-declared mission was to revolutionize the
society for the good of the people. For the good of a
backward and uncivilized people, however, a people whose
commitment to progress and civilization could not be
relied on. The consequence was that the society- the real
people, that is to say- could not be trusted to take part
its own revolution (Robins, 1996, p. 70).
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This goal of modernization was strictly defined and
formulated by the central power and was being imposed on
the rest of the society, which is to say dissent,
opposition and any kind of counterview were not welcomed
and tolerated (Belge, 1993, p. 13). This intolerance of
oppositional voices has also been highlighted by Karpat
in his article where he defined the characteristics of
the 1980 military takeover. Karpat stressed: “In general,
the military considered that political parties should be
the instruments of national unity, order and stability
rather than vehicles for the expression of special
interests of social or economic groups or particular
regions of the country” (Karpat, 1988, p. 152).
In the end, the military was in power for three years and
in the year 1983 the management of the country was
attorned to a civilian government - to ANAP (Anavatan;
Motherland Party, a right wing party) headed by Turgut
Özal together with a new constitution formed in 1982
(Robins, 1996, p. 73). The 1982 Constitution was formed
under the control and guidance of the military; therefore
it was the constitution of strict inhibitions,
restrictions and supervision. As also defined and
described by Sunar and Sayari:
What is envisioned in the 1982 Constitution is a
state divorced from politics and a depoliticized
society. A state-controlled Council of Higher
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Education supervises the universities; political
parties cannot form auxiliary branches; labor unions,
professional associations, and university faculty
members cannot engage in politics; and the government
is allowed to confiscate newspapers and periodicals
before their publication… The party and election laws
were designed to favor two major centrist parties;
Communist, Fascist, and theocratic parties were
outlawed (Sunar & Sayari, 1986, p. 184).
Those three years under the rule of the military and the
constitution of the 1982 that was setup under the
guidance of the coup government, naturally could not have
made possible a total civilization and a complete return
of democracy to the country. As Binnaz Toprak also
pointed to this difficulty of total democratization in
the period after the military coup of 1980: “Taken as a
whole, the 1982 Constitution and other post-1980
legislation represent a significant attempt toward
depoliticization coupled with greater state control over
both legal arena and the institutional framework of the
nascent civil society in Turkey” (Toprak, 1988, p. 127).
The 12 September military coup has been ingrained in the
memories as a socio-political event that was launched
targeting at the most politicized decade of the Turkish
history (Laçiner, 2007, para. 1).
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2.3. The Aftermath of the 12 September Military Coup in
the Political and Economical Sense
Ömer Laçiner (1993) argues that the Turkish political
parties founded in the mid 1980s were established with
the reinforced principles adapted from the political
policies and the rooted convictions of the putsch
government, such as supporting and promoting de-
politicization and blocking any oppositional ideology (p.
17).
It should be noted that the shift in the social life was
a reflection of the shifts in the political and economic
life after the ANAP government was delegated for the
management of the country on the 6th of November, in
1983; therefore the political and economical shifts
during the 1980s bear a considerable significance. It
could be argued that the Anap government headed by Turgut
Özal was given the project and the mission to reunify the
Turkish society, whose main elements could be put under
two major categories: 1. reconciliation of the political
parties; 2. getting the society also support it by the
influence of Islam as a cultural re-unifier. As also
stressed by Robins:
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The new project was called “Özalism,” which involved;
…the unification of the mainstream political
groupings under the banner of ANAP, along with a
refocusing cultural orientation of Turkish society,
by which the intention was bringing together of
religious conservative circles and liberal Kemalist
tendencies. The new cultural orientation emphasized
the significance of Islam as a unifying element in
the society. The nationalism and religious ideas of
the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ were influential
within one wing of ANAP. In this respect, Özalism may
be seen as a conservative project, in continuity with
the earlier political culture of unity and consensus,
merely giving a religious inflection to an
authoritarian state (Robins, 1996, p. 73).
The Özalism project also involved economic dynamics and
radical changes in economic policies. The ANAP government
quit the national progressive economy and instead
supported the neo-liberal economic policies, which
cardinally promoted the financial aids and neo-liberal
strategies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
reducing the role of the government whereas expanding the
privatization (Robins, 1996, pp. 73-74). Ahmad (1993)
also stated in his book “Özal, with close ties to
financial circles in the West (especially the IMF and the
World Bank), had been consulted by the junta immediately
after the coup“ (p. 183). As also underlined by Asuman
Suner (2005), the policies that were advised by the IMF
basically aimed “to hasten the process of compounding of
Turkey with the global capitalism“ (p. 20). As a result
of that, consuming was encouraged in every field of life,
as also underlined by Ahmad:
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The new money created a consumer boom fed by Özal’s
liberal import policy. Suddenly everything was
available in the stores but at a price. Advertising,
especially on television, became more sophisticated
with commercials aimed at specific audiences. During
soccer matches, for example, the commercials were
aimed at male audiences to encourage the purchase of
cars, motor oil, beer and clothes (Ahmad, 1993, p.
209).
By considering all this, it could be argued that one gets
the impression that the society’s trending to get
involved in the global trends and inclinations of turning
into a consumer society took place only as a result of
the policies followed by the Özal government promoted by
the Turkish military, three years after the 12 September
military coup in 1980. At this point it would be
appropriate to mention the theory put forward by Murat
Belge (1993), who claims that the orientation of the
Turkish society towards the consumer culture was not only
actualized through the military coup and the liberal
political policies followed afterwards, because the
Turkish society had already been familiar with the social
and economical global trends before the military
intervention in spite of being isolated from the rest of
the world in such positive fields as human right
improvements, the spreading of democracy, and  working
for the world peace and environment protection (p. 8). It
is possible to find the traces of Belge’s theory in his
following statement: “…From hoola-hoop to mini skirts,
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from Penthouse to Lotto; whatever was invented in Europe
or in the world, it immediately was reflected to us
(Turkish society). We never are isolated in such fields,
and we have never been” (Belge, 1993, p. 8).
In short, Belge believes that the Turkish society would
have still adapted to the rules and circumstances of the
global and economic trends, which he himself describes as
a negative trend, even if the September 12 had never
taken place. According to Belge, “Turkey, with its
natural talents, would have kept pace with the rest of
the world in following the movement of getting shallow,
superficial and self-centered” (1993, p. 8). However,
there are academicians holding the belief the September
12 military takeover has had a vitally significant role
in the shaping of the perception of western and global
trends, which could all be defined under the category of
modernism. Karpat also argued that one of the key changes
of the September 12 event was the perception of modernism
and its principles only on the economic and material
level (Karpat, 1988, p. 156). He emphasized the
following:
The key ideological change has occurred in the
meaning attached to ‘modernism.’ Today the cultural
and political emulation of the West is no longer the
axis of modernism. It is, rather, economic
development, technological advancement, and material
progressin all its forms (Karpat, 1988, p. 156).
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As it has also been discussed by Laçiner (2001 & 2002) in
his article called 1980’ler: Kapan(may)an Bir Parantez
Mi? (1980s: Is It an Unclosable Paranthesis?), one of the
most significant consequences of the promoted neo-liberal
policies was the economic gap between the lower and the
upper classes, widening every day; people working under
the service of the government began to earn less whereas
those who preferred/had the chance to work for the
private sector - at the multinational companies,
especially on the fields of communication and finance -
were able to push up their life standards toward the
better. As a result; health, education and social
security services were not delivered justly (Kandiyoti,
2003, p. 19). In short, until the 1980s, the political
utterance was the promise to organize political policies
that would increase the welfare standards of the society
(Laçiner, 2002, pp. 15-16). However, after the 1980s the
political utterance has dramatically changed and has
turned into an economical power utterance aiming to
“conquer” the world market with its new companies and
sectors and to achieve great accomplishments in world
economy (Laçiner, 1994, p.10).
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2.4. The Effects of the 12 September Military Coup on the
Turkish Socio-Cultural Life
All dictators (dictatorships) tell you what to think
and how to think. This is the definition of
dictatorship and that is why it is evil (Belge, 1993,
p. 29).
It could be argued that one of the most crucial
extensions of this privatization period was on the
cultural life; privatization of radio and television
broadcasting. In the year 1994, the Law on the Private
Radio and Television was passed, and hundreds of radio
and television stations both on the local and national
scale started to make broadcasting. In other words, the
monopoly of TRT (Turkish Radio and Television) was ended,
and competition among the hundreds of private radio and
television stations was introduced. It could be argued
that the images, pictures and allegations promoted by the
current media ethics helped the justification of the neo-
liberal economic system, particularly by utilizing the
cultural orientation of Islam. As underlined by Kevin
Robins and Asu Aksoy (2000):
This alternative narrative would also have to take
account of rural and religious migrations into media
spaces, particularly as a consequence of the
development of commercial television in the 1990s,
sustaining a new popular culture- including arabesk-
that dramatically outpaced the ‘official’ output of
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the state broadcaster TRT7, and alos worked to
normalize and render ordinary the image of the ‘dark
face’ of Islam8 (Robins & Aksoy, 2000, p. 209).
The primary aim of the commercial television could be
interpreted to be that the idea was promoted and imposed
that it was always possible to make improvements on the
individual level and to go up into a higher social class.
To conclude, it would not be wrong to attest that
consuming and idealizing the wealthy life style began to
be seen as the only meaning in life (Ahmad, 1993, p.
209). The secondary aim of the commercial TV was to
involve the people in masses flowing into the western
cities from the eastern villages during the 1980s. As
mentioned above, the urbanization had already started in
mid-1960s as a result of the industrialization that
appeared on the stage during the 1950s. However, the
migration during the 1980s was at its peak, and people
who had not been touched by the secular Kemalist ideals
and implementations of the republic occupied the cities
preserving their own cultural elements, customs and
traditions (Robins, 1996, p. 75) As Robins puts it; “the
Real Turkey made its presence felt” (1996, p. 75). This
7
 See also Robins, K. & Aksoy, A. (1997). Peripheral vision:
Cultural industries and cultural identities in Turkey.
Paragraph, 20, 75-99.
8
 See also Öncü, A. (1994). Packaging Islam: Cultural politics
on the landscape of Turkish commercial television. New
Perspectives on Turkey, 10, 13-36.
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fact transferred another ‘significant duty’ on the new
commercial television channels that were charged with
justifying the ideology of the ongoing neo-liberal
system. Robins emphasizes:
The proliferation of new commercial television
channels has become a crucial means of facilitating
the encounter with the diversity of civil society.
Under the old state broadcasting system (TRT), Turks
only ever saw images of the official culture. The new
commercial companies are eager to reach the new
populations (and markets), and are consequently
making programs about the real Turkey (Robins, 1996,
p. 76).
The on-going shifts done in the field of politics and
economy for the sake of modernization of Turkey and for
the reunification of political parties inevitably
affected the social arena, and helped the reformation of
the members of the society with new value systems. Belge
stresses that the 1980s could be regarded as a decade in
which the freedom of thought and expression were
restrained and the oppositional/dissenting voices were
appeased. This situation involving inhibitions,
limitations, restrictions and the quelling/censoring of
the oppositional voices could be regarded as an extension
of the 1982 Constitution prepared under the supervision
of the military into the social life. Counterviews were
not tolerated any more; furthermore they were muted
(Belge, 1993, p. 13). The members of the society who had
been actively participating in the political and social
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life before the 12 September military coup and who were
forced to keep their controversial views for themselves
with the anti-democratic applications of the military,
then were oriented to keep themselves busy with the other
fields of everyday life. Briefly, “the new ideological
power did not want any opposition or dissenting voices,
which it considered to be equivalent with treason felony
(Belge, 1993, p. 13). That is to say, the grounding of
the de-politicization process began to be formed in the
1980s. Furthermore, those people could be said to have
gone through a “social explosion” as Nurdan Gürbilek
defined it (1992, pp. 16-17). In other words, on the one
hand people were experiencing the suppression of their
thoughts and expression, and on the other hand they were
experimenting the explosion of expression, image and
pictures, encouraged by the hundreds of private radio and
television stations. This may seem like a contradictory
position; however when analyzed more deeply, it could
easily be observed that this explosion in the public
sphere on consuming the allegations, images and pictures
was just a justification of the on-going system in order
to give public the impression that the social unrest and
the critical political crisis period were now overcome,
everything was under control and the nation was safe.
This attitude could be assumed to be the denial of the
big shock created by the 12 September military
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intervention and its aftermath. It could, however, also
be interpreted that, as also underlined by Hilmi Maktav
(2001 &2002), social fields which were freed from the
politics and oppositional dispositions as a result of the
12 September event, were now filled with utterances done
over private lives and promises on individual levels (p.
225).
As a result of all these, the cultural life was also
materialized and it became a commodity for the neo-
liberal market. With all these variety in the media, it
might have seemed like a polyphony; however when the
content is considered, it will be seen that there was no
real alternative to what was being presented to the
public.
Although it was true that there were serious limitations
and constraints on the intellectual, ideological and
cultural life, it should also be noted here that the
oppositional voices were not totally managed to be
killed. There were still some, who wanted to create a
dissenting movement and declare and spread it through
cultural products, in order to utter the injustice and
the negativity about the application of the ongoing
system; however it was quite grueling to find a place in
the market for themselves to raise their voices, owing to
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the conflict with the ascending social and economic
values of the public that were formed and re-organized by
the new economic system promoted. As a result of this, as
also underlined by Mesut Kara, “a society was
constituted, which was getting invidualized, isolated and
fragmented. Briefly a new human culture was created“
(Makal et al., 2007, p. 57).
2.5. The Influences of the 12 September on the Turkish
Cinema as Part of the Cultural Life
Together with the 12 September, by which the
intellectual conception was demeaned, taking
political stands were identified with terrorism, and
the depoliticization policy was infiltrating into the
every single domain of life, it could not have been
expected that this would not affect the cinema and
literature (Kıraç, 2007, p. 51).
It could be claimed that there were still some
oppositional groups endeavoring to raise their voices and
declare their complaints and dissatisfaction about the
new system, in spite of the 12 September military coup
and the society it reformed and re-organized. These
groups wanted to utilize the mass communication
instruments to be able to reach the masses. Cinema was
only one of those instruments; perhaps an influential
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one. The cinema is definitely a very powerful means of
mass media and a very vibrant source of education,
although it is non-official. It could be professed that
the cinema cannot represent itself by abstracting itself
from the very social, political or economic experiences
of a society. Therefore, it could be deduced that the
cinema can never be thought to be distant from the value
judgments, political and ideological tendencies. This is
the reason why the dissenting voices of the time had big
difficulties trying to utilize the cinema to make their
remarks and statements; because now the cinema also
belonged to the market; and in that market there was no
room for voices spoiling the harmony of the chorus. As
underlined by Meral Gündoğdu:
When the insufficiency of strength in the return of
intellectuals –of course also film-makers- is
considered at length, the concern of getting a safe
place within the relationship between the media and
market, and furthermore, a powerful ideological
submission will be encountered (Gündoğdu, 1993, p.
40).
Nijat Özön (1995) noted that in 1966 Turkey ranked as the
fourth country after Japan, India and Hong Kong in film
production, with 229 films (p. 34). Nezih Erdoğan and
Deniz Göktürk (2001) stressed that the film production in
Turkey in the year 1972 was at its peak with 298 films
(p. 535). However, the economic liveliness in cinema
sector experienced in the first half of the 1970s came to
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an end as a result of the spreading of television
culture, the increasing production expenditures,
investors’ trending to make cheap sex films as a result
of the economic crisis (Maktav, 2001 & 2002, p. 225)9.
In the 1980s the cinema in Turkey was trying to get over
the crisis which had actually started in the late 1970s.
The 1970s, promising years of Turkish cinema, was left
behind (Maktav, 2001 & 2002, p. 225). Still cinema in the
1980s managed to re-acquire its prestige that was lost
during the 1970s. The number of the films made in 1980
was 68; however this number rose to 184 in the year 1986
(Özgüç, 1997, p. 38). However this improvement in Turkish
cinema did not escalate for a long time. American film
distribution companies started opening offices in Turkey,
which brought along the awakening of Hollywood cinema in
Turkey. The number of films that were produced by Turkish
film-makers were too less whereas the imported films were
quite popular among the public. In the year 1989, only 12
Turkish films managed to be screened over against 210
9 For further information and discussion on the economic
crisis experienced by Turkish cinema during the 1970s, see
also:
Abisel, N. (1994). Türk sineması üzerine yazılar (Notes on
Turkish cinema). Ankara: İmge Kitabevi; and
Onaran, A. Ş. (1994). Türk sineması (Turkish cinema) (Vol. I).
Ankara: Kitle Yayınları.
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Hollywood movies shown in the same year (Evren, 1994, p.
35, qtd. in Maktav, 2002, p. 227). This discrepancy
between the ratios of Turkish and Hollywood films got
even larger in the 1990s.
In the years following the 12 September military coup the
number and the content of the Turkish films produced did
not change drastically; meaning the quantitative and
qualitative features were kept stabilized. The far-east
fight films and the arabesque films in which the popular
arabesque singers took place were also preferred by the
audience of the 1980s. However it should also be noted
here that together with the types of films mentioned
above, in the 1980s, the films that aimed to reflect the
sufferings of the 12 September coup were also made in
addition to some successful opposition films made around
the same years such as Yol (written by Yılmaz Güney and
directed by Şerif Gören in 1982), Hakkari’de Bir Mevsim
(by Erden Kıral, in 1983) and Uçurtmayı Vurmasınlar (by
Tunç Başaran, in 1989) (Maktav, 2002, p. 226). Hilmi
Maktav features the Turkish cinema of the 1980s as the
cinema of the 12 September (2002, p. 226).
However these films and their directors have been
criticized to a great extent because of the assumption
that they did not discuss the social-political phenomenon
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of the 12 September in the way they were supposed to do,
and they did not aim to awaken a conscious among the
public. This issue seemed to be problematic when one
considers the fact that the cinema is perhaps the only
art form that is being expected to bring up a discussion
on the very issue of the 12 September. As also underlined
in the following passage taken from Engin Ayça:
People always expect something from the cinema. Do
people carry out a similar inquiry about the other
arts or artists? We do not ask a painter whether or
not he has made the painting of the 12 September, or
we do not ask a singer why he/she has not made a song
for the 12 September; however we ask the film-maker
why he/she has not told the story of the 12 September
(Makal et al., 2007, p. 58).
It could be argued that Ayça seems to be right in his
ascertainment about the art forms/artists and people’s
different expectations from them. Similarly, Hilmi Maktav
draws the attention to the same topic. In his article
where he discusses the reflections of the 12 September
military coup in Turkish cinema, Maktav (2000) claims
that the so-called 12 September films do not question the
event and its aftermath in the literal sense; rather they
just focus on the memories left from that period. He
argues that especially the ending of the films are far
away from making a critique of the event but, more in the
mood of convincing the audience that film characters
would lead a happy life forever despite the tragic event
(Maktav, 2000, p. 84). Maktav brings along a very
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functional critique on 12 September films; however might
be missing one important point in his questioning owing
to his generalization on what kind of an impression or
feeling the audience might possibly receive from films.
It should also not be ignored that there will be a group
seeing the films and remembering and commemorating the 12
September event and sympathize with filmic characters.
Particularly, the very people who have experienced that
period personally will get over their melancholy and
start living today, as also underlined by Hakan Şükrü
Doğruöz (2007, p. 71). This could still considered to
prove the power of the cinema medium and its popularity
among the public. As mentioned above, the cinema is
considered by many to be the most influential artistic
weapon through which groups can reach to masses and
promulgate their statements and stands in life.
Therefore, the endeavors and the desire to make the film
of the 12 September should always continue. The
assumption that “no successful 12 September film has been
made until now,” cannot justify any reason not to
criticize the ones that have already been made and to
make any further films on the issue.
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2.6. The 12 September Turkish Films and Their Political
Disposition
Maktav (2000) argues that the 12 September military
takeover represents significance in terms of two major
perspectives: In the first place, it has changed the
historical perspective of people by influencing the
social perception; therefore it also has affected the
cinema as a cultural product of the society. This to say,
a new period has begun in Turkish cinema history, which
could be named as “post-80s” (p. 79). Secondly, films
have been made after the second half of the 1980s, which
thematize the chaos atmosphere and turmoil of the pre-
1980 period and the coercion years which were brought
along with the 12 September military coup (p. 79). Maktav
also claims that films do not directly deal with the 12
September military coup but, they indirectly talk about
the event (2000, p. 79). According to Maktav there are
films that criticize the oppression period brought along
by the 12 September event as well as films that consider
the chaotic atmosphere of the pre-1980 period to have
been caused by leftist activists (2000, p. 79). Maktav
also claims that it is possible to come across films that
consider the 12 September event as a chaos and do not
question the perpetrators but, are only interested in the
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psychological disaster caused by the very event (2000, p.
79).
It could be argued by many that cinema is one of the most
important artistic instruments that transmit reality
through representation of images. However this
representative function of the cinema, as mentioned
above, inevitably becomes a controversial issue when the
nature of the cinema is taken into consideration. Debates
concerning this issue date back to the Lumière Brothers
(1895) who discovered portable camera and made the first
documentary films by taking their invention to the
streets, and following this, to Georges Méliès, a
magician who made the first fantasy films, having
developed some special effects to contribute into the
filmic language by emphasizing the elements of the
fantasy world that was created through the film
(Kracauer, 1985 [1960], p. 10). With the different
perspectives they reflected on their films, Lumière
Brothers and Méliès started different filmic traditions;
the former inspiring the realist tradition and the latter
leading the formalist tradition (Kracauer, 1985 [1960],
pp. 10-14).
The nature of that visual and auditory art of film making
where the image is thought to be identical with the
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movement (image = movement), seems to be contradictory
with the idea that cinema is an instrument, which
transmits the reality through representation of images.
In other words, at the level of immanence, the movement-
image binary destroys the very logic of representation.
That is to say its model would not be natural perception,
but rather a "state of things that is constantly
changing, a stream of material, in which no anchoring
point or center of reference could be indicated“
(Deleuze, 1989, p. 86). In spite of the fact that the
representational characteristic may be distorted the very
logic of representation, it could be argued that the art
of film-making can still be used to make statements,
depending on the point of view of the film-maker and
his/her unique ways and styles of promoting his/her art.
In spite of the fact that it could be argued that it
creates a certain problematic situation to define the 12
September Turkish films owing to what has been included
and what excluded within the films, it is true that the
political instability and polarization among the parties
that started long before the 1980s, the coercion period
that came along with the military coup of 1980, the state
and conditions of people who were put into jail in that
specific period and the changing social relationships in
the society occurred often as important themes in Turkish
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made after 1980. It is clear that 12 September was a
political event as well as a debrief and a social event.
However, this fact does not bring about the necessity
that every film that deals with, discusses or mentions
the 12 September military coup makes a political
statement, and therefore, it questions the hegemonic
ideology. The concept of political cinema is itself a
problematic concept that it is difficult to define and
draw borders. Suner (2005) argues that there is no doubt
that the so called 12 September Turkish films focus on
the real and/or hypothetical political events, that they
problematize the official ideology and lay out a
dissident stance; however, beyond thematizing political
acts and affairs, it is not possible to talk about a
common critical questioning in a true sense. Therefore,
Suner argues that it does not look so logical to use the
term “political” for all the Turkish films that deal with
the political events (2005, p. 255). This is due to the
fact that there are also film-makers and films that do
not directly thematize political events and stay away
from the up-to-date political events, but those films can
still be counted in the category of political films owing
to the attitude they maintain in the context of human
existence and related issues such as identity and
belonging (Suner, 2005, p. 256).
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Then at this point it would be logical to refer to French
director Jean-Luc Godard, considering his definition of
the cinema as “a form that thinks,” which he pointed out
in the voiceover of his video project Histoire(s) du
cinema: La monnaie de l'absolu (1989, min. 12:20). This
definition of the cinema by Godard could be lead to the
interpretation that in the cinema it is mostly the point
of view in which the main story is told by the film-
maker. Vrääth Öhner (2003) could be claimed to have
analyzed and summarized this Godardian perspective in his
article, What Does Political Film-Making Mean?:
In fact, there is something problematical about the
relationship between film and politics, which does
not permit simply going from one to the other, from
making films to making politics and vice versa. What
is problematical here has to do with the position
from which one speaks, with speaking itself, and with
the medium that conveys it; in short: with the
problem of the "how" of representation, in which the
becoming-problematical of every form of
representation is found (Öhner, What does political
film-making mean?,  2003, para. 3).
In this sense, in spite of the unconcern of films to make
a political statement right out loud, it would not be
wrong to claim that politics are included in the art of
film. This is to say that the film-maker does not have to
make a special effort to include what is political in his
film, because what is political in the film is not as
easy to identify as it may be thought. It could be a
simple statement, one small imagery detail in one scene
51
or could be spread throughout the film. What could be
identified as political could even be something that is
not included, mentioned or referred to in the film, but
could be something that is totally excluded.
However it should not be forgotten that making
interpretations and creating meanings from a film is not
a one way process; what the audience understands from the
film or how it interprets it is as significant as what
the film-maker aims to present and tell to the audience.
The meanings produced by the audience could be totally
original and free from the intentions of the film-maker.
This is also one factor that builds up a relationship
between what is political and the cinema, “because the
audience brings his own political thoughts and opinions
as well as his ethical and cultural values, and evaluates
the film with those thoughts“ (Yılmaz, 1997, p. 10). It
would be awkward to deny the fact that while consuming
one particular media text, one would bring other
discourses that he/she has come across so far, in that
particular area or in other directly/indirectly related
areas, as well. The messages that he/she has got prior to
the new messages he/she receives at the very moment come
together in order to make sense of what is being watched
at that specific moment, and are definitely going to
affect the way he/she will decode, interpret and make use
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of other messages in the future time. The sociologist
David Morley (1992) stated the following:
They (the new messages) intersect with other messages
that we have received – explicit and   implicit
messages, from other institutions, people we know, or
sources of information we trust… Thus, how we respond
to messages from the media depends precisely on the
extent to which they fit with, or possibly
contradict, other messages, other viewpoints that we
have come across in other areas of our lives (Morley,
1992, p. 77).
Making his/her own interpretations, the audience in this
way, becomes a subject that gets constituted and re-
constituted each time he / she is faced with any kind of
a discourse; he/she becomes an arena where the
multiplicity of discourses meet, that is ready for a new
discourse, which will relate itself to the previous
messages. The following passage by Pécheux (1982
[1975])10 also points to this issue:
…interpellation – the entry into language and the
symbolic – which constitutes a space wherein a
complex of continually interpellated subject forms
interrelate, each subject form being a determinate
formation of discursive processes. The discursive
subject is therefore an interdiscourse, the product
of the effects of discursive practices traversing the
subject throughout its history (Pécheux, qtd. in
Morley, 1992, p. 164)11.
10
 For further information see Pêcheux, M. (1982[1975]).
Language, semantics and ideology, New York: St. Martin's Press.
11
 See also Pécheux, M. (1988). Discourse: Structure or event?.
In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the
interpretation of culture. (pp. 633-650). Urbana & Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
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Considering this sense that has been mentioned above,
each film could be considered to be a political film, and
this is to say it is almost impossible draw borders to
the genre of political cinema and discover its limits.
The Turkish film critic, Atilla Dorsay (1984) dealt with
this problematic of the political cinema and tried to
draw borders of this specific genre. According to Dorsay
(1984), in order for a film to be considered to be within
the boarders of the political cinema, it should try to
have a direct rather than an indirect political content,
and should aim to create a shock for the audience, which
will urge or provoke his world view and his political
choice in a certain way. Dorsay divided the genre of the
political cinema into four different categories: 1. Films
that reflect the significant and well known political
events of the recent past. 2. Films that use of the
fictional and imaginary events in order to transmit
political thoughts and views. 3. Films that have
political characteristics. 4. Fantasy political cinema
(Dorsay, 1984, pp. 35-36).
It would be too optimistic to argue that many examples of
political cinema have been observed throughout the
political history of Turkey. However there have also been
efforts by some film-makers such as Yılmaz Güney, who
made social realist films in the 1970s. 1980s were also
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rich of important political events; considering its
social effects and long-term influences and the
continuity of those social effects, the 12 September
military coup, as a turning point in the Turkish
political history, became an important material for the
content of a good number of films made after 1980.
Although, in those films brought together under the title
of the 12 September films, the military coup of the 12
September has never been directly dealt with, the periods
before and after the actual event have been densely used
as a background in Turkish films.  Considering this fact,
it could be argued that Turkish films thematizing the 12
September event can be put into Dorsay’s second political
film category, which use of the fictional and imaginary
events in order to transmit political thoughts and views.
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3. FROM COLLECTIVE MEMORY TO THE MATTER OF
TRAUMATIC MEMORY THROUGH MATTERS OF COMING TO
TERMS WITH THE PAST AND COLLECTIVE CRIME
3.1. The Origins of the Term Collective Memory
History combines in our language the objective as
well as the subjective side. It means both res gestae
(the things that happened) and historica rerum
gestarum (the narration of the things that happened).
This is no coincidence (Hegel, qtd. in Funkenstein,
1989, p. 5).
The estimation that the human being is social and
collective-oriented entity has existed since Aristotle
(335 BC) with the assumption that human beings depend on
each other to survive. Karl Marx extended this assumption
by claiming that human beings are social beings owing to
the fact that they are themselves products of the very
56
society. According to this assumption, we are all
collective products of our society just like a commodity
being a collective product of the factory it has been
produced (Akçam, 1993, p. 25). A human being is complete
with its physical and mental existence; therefore
considering the assumptions above, it would not be wrong
to argue that the idea of “collectiveness” has existed
for a long time.
However, the concept of collective memory had long been
regarded as mystification before Maurice Halbwachs
ushered a new era in the discussion of this concept,
primarily with his book called The Social Framework of
Memory and Collective Memory, which he published in the
year 1925 and by which he emphasized the significance of
the social memory and argued that even individual memory
carried the traces of the collective memory. It could be
claimed that initially his sociological approach on the
concept of memory was severely criticized owing to his
adaptation of such terms as “remembering,” “forgetting”
and “memory,” which were already being studied and
disputed within the framework of the discipline of
psychology.
In spite of the fact that Freud and Halbwachs, the former
with his  psychological and psychoanalytical approach to
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the issue of memory, and the latter with his sociological
perspective on the topic of memory, formulated their
views around the same time period, it could be said that
Halbwachs’ theory was ignored until recently whereas
Freud’s theory received a considerable attention. Patrick
Hutton (1994) explained the reason of the negligence of
Halbwachs’ theory at the time it was formulated and its
receiving more attention in the postmodern era as to be
the contemporary (postmodern) historians’ exertion to
explain and perhaps justify the abandoning of the modern
tradition, in relation to the politics of memory (p.
149). As Hutton also made it clear in his article, it
could be stated that Halbwachs and Freud agreed on the
fact that the living memory is constituted by the mutual
interaction of repetition and recollection, but the
former chose to explain the case in accordance with the
social dynamics whereas the latter believed that the case
functioned in accordance with the psychological dynamic.
Unlike Freud, Halbwachs argued that the repeated memories
cannot be conveyed and recited intact; meaning they
change in time and “they are conflated as they are
continuously being revised“ (Hutton, 1994, p. 149). The
second important assumption made by Halbwachs is that
memories are reconstructed each time they are repeated
within the framework of the social context. As a
recollection of these two assumptions, one can deduce
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that the images of the past in one’s memory cannot be the
original images, but rather those images are adapted to
the current social framework and conceptions of today.
Halbwachs emphasized his theory as in the following
passage:
When we return to a city previously visited, what we
perceive helps us to restore a picture, certain
portions of which had been forgotten. If what we
currently see fits into the framework of our old
memories, the converse is also true, for these
memories adapt to the mass of present perceptions. It
is as if we were comparing the testimony of several
witnesses. In spite of discrepancies, they agree on
the essentials that permit us to reconstruct a body
of remembrances that we recognize (Halbwachs, 1980,
p. 22).
Thus, it could be argued that “what we remember,
therefore, is a function of the influence that social
groups presently have over us. Without social frameworks
to sustain them, individual memories wither away“
(Hutton, 1994, p. 149).
Halbwachs is well know for putting an emphasis on the
“recollectivity” of the memories in his works and for his
main thesis arguing that the memory is predicated on the
social conditions and contexts. In the quotation below,
it could be evidently depicted that Halbwachs (1980)
almost openly denied the individual framework of the
memory; meaning that one’s physical-personal experience
of the past memories do not change the social dimension
of the case, owing to the fact that experiences have been
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accumulating up to that moment, being re-constructed each
time of remembrance.
We appeal to witnesses to corroborate or invalidate
as well as supplement what we somehow know already
about an event that in many other details remains
obscure. One witness we can always call on is
ourselves… Our memories remain collective, however,
and are recalled to us through others even though
only we were participants in the events or saw the
things concerned. In reality, we are never alone.
Other men need not be physically present, since we
always carry with us and in us a number of distinct
persons (Halbwachs, 1980, p.  23).
3.2. From Individuals’ to Societies’ Collective
Memory/Recollective Nature
It would not be wrong to claim that societies also have
stories just like individuals do. As Mithat Sancar (2007)
also underlines, these societal stories are given names
like “past” or “history” (p. 11). The name history does
not only refer to the past events that actually took
place in one era of a society but, what is more
interesting, it also refers to what people recall about
those past events, in relation to what they are presented
with in the contemporary times. As Susan Crane (1997)
also underlined the fact:
Perhaps the most banal thing that could be said about
history, in general, is that ‘it happened’ or
something happened. But of course, history is not
only the past or pasts that ‘happened’ or continue to
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happen, it is also what is written or produced about
those pasts both then and now (Crane, 1997, p. 1372).
The individuals and societies of today also both have an
interactive relationship with their past, which is to
argue that they –whether they are aware of this fact or
not- form or re-shape their on-going present taking the
past experiences into consideration as well as having an
impression of their “histories” being under the influence
of today. Amos Funkenstein (1989), a scholar working in
the field of collective memory, also explained the
significance and the position of “the present” within the
complete insight of the theory as follows: “The
experience of memory is also a measure of time. The past
is the remembered present, just as the future is the
anticipated present: memory is always derived from the
present and from the contents of the present“
(Funkenstein, 1989, p. 9).
It could be claimed that some individuals and societies
would have a tendency to forget about their past or an
intuitive desire to escape from it. Whether or not
individuals or societies accept that, it is an inevitable
fact that the past always stands behind them, and it
always occupies a space and significance in today’s
world. It could be said that this tendency or aim to bury
the past or escape from one’s own past creates a kind of
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a vicious circle in the sense that the insistence on the
act of ignoring or brushing aside could be argued to be
bringing along the consequence that the stuff that is
being hidden from increases its emphasis and its
influence and efficacy on the present day even more. It
could be argued that this tendency to ignore the past had
long been a strategy that was used by the nation states.
This kind of a relationship between the past and a nation
state was found to be mandatory in order to create and
retain the integral characteristics of building a
favorable identity for the nation state. In order to
pursue this aspiration, a past which is full of heroic
events or myths of heroism were taken as references with
a view to keep their national identity virtuous and
decent.
At this point it would be relevant to refer to Freud’s
studies on the processes of memory. Freud (1986 [1901])
stated that it is highly encountered that one’s childhood
memories are full of trivial, insignificant and unrelated
details in terms of the content. He explained the reason
of this finding as to have been engendered owing to a
“relocation process.” What he meant by this relocation
process is the fact that all these childhood impressions
and memories that seem meaningless and incongruous
essentially substitute other meaningful impressions from
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the childhood. Those memories which have been substituted
were defined by Freud to be the “screen memory“ (Freud,
1986 [1901], p. 45). In short, “screen memories are
substitute images that displace more painful memories in
our conscious reminiscences. They are, in effect, place
markers for the true record of past experience that the
unconscious psyche covetously conceals” (Hutton, 1994, p.
147).
In order to connect it to what was the main topic one
paragraph above, it has to be stated that Freud built up
a connection, and made an analogy between the formation
of the screen memory and the aspiration of a nation state
to create certain characteristics. To make it clearer, it
could be said that Freud argued that the legends and the
myths a nation has resemble the screen memory of
individuals’ childhoods, in the sense that national
legendary stories and myths substitute other real stories
that cannot be recalled any more (Freud, 1986 [1901], p.
48).
Sancar (2007) underlined the fact that the science of
history is used widespread while building the national
identity and the national memory, and that the education
system and schools, which constitute one of the most
significant rings of the Ideological State Apparatus
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chain, operate effectively to teach children the history
of the nation-state in the very way that the current
ideology envisages it, by arranging curriculums and
course books appropriate to serve for their purpose of
creating and sustaining a clean record for the nation
state. Apart from that, certain government agencies are
founded in order to support and propagate the official
history findings (Sancar, 2007, p. 18). As a result of
these efforts to form a clean record of the nation state,
it is expected that a society, which will be proud of its
own history with the uppermost self-esteem possible, will
be produced and perpetuated.  It should also be added
that together with the endeavors to develop legendary
historical stories and myths about a nation state, there
is another fundamental thing required to be done so as to
constitute a nation state with a clean and virtuous
history; and that is to prevent members and individuals
of the society from remembering the real past experiences
that may also include wars, times of domestic warfare
societal distortation, genocides… so on and so forth, by
imposing a prohibition against talking and discussing
about the past on the forensic, political  and public
levels. It can be argued that the aim here would be to
“deny, block and repress each and everything that could
bring back the past“ (Sancar, 2007, p. 19).
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As it is clear from the aims and the aspirations of the
ideologies trying to form nation states, it would not be
wrong to claim that the image of past that is presented
here is a reconstructed one. The way in which members of
the society recalls the past on the
collective/cultural/social level differs from the way
individuals would separately recall their past. As it can
be seen from the explanations, it can be argued that the
collective memory has a capacity to reconstruct the past.
It is apparent that individual memories cannot preserve
the past in the way it really was, but rather they
preserve it on the collective level. That is to say that
what stays in minds of people is what is presented to
them in the contemporary era.
Cultural memory works by reconstructing, that is, it
always relates its knowledge to an actual and
contemporary situation. True, it is fixed in
immovable figures of memory and stores of knowledge,
but every contemporary context relates to these
differently, sometimes by appropriation, sometimes by
criticism, sometimes by preservation or by
transformation. Cultural memory exists in two modes:
first in the mode of potentiality of the archive
whose accumulated texts, images, and rules of conduct
as a total horizon, and second in the mode of
actuality, whereby each contemporary context puts the
objectivized meaning into its own perspective, giving
its own relevance (Assmann, 1995, p. 130).
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3.3. The Appearing of the Concept Coming to Terms with
the Past after 1945 as a National Issue and its
Acquisition of a Global Perspective in the 1980s
Sancar (2007) argues that this strategy of repressing the
real factual events of the past was effectively operated
for quite a long time; until the beginning of the 1980s,
when the relationship between the sense of history and
national identity had to be put into question earnestly,
which brought along a shift in this traditional paradigm
(p. 19). Then one may want to ask the reason why all of a
sudden there emerged a need to question this traditional
relationship between history and national identity. The
answer to that kind of a question would be that the
socio-political events experienced throughout the world
such as “the breakdown of the military dictatorship in
Latin America, the breakdown of the racist regime in
South Africa, the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc
engendered the societies to go in an exchange process in
their relationships to their pasts“ (Sancar, 2007, p.
19).  That is why the topic of relationship to one’s own
past was put into question seriously and why the issues
related to the memory became popular subject matters of
discussions. It could be said that a concept coming out
of these discussions became widely used, and when
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literally translated, this concept is called “coming to
terms with the past.”
Above it has been stated that these discussions on the
memory became popular in the 1980. However it should also
be underlined at this point that this issue related to
the relationship between the past and the national
identity became a subject matter after the World War II,
beginning in 1945 (Sancar, 2007, p. 26) . At the time the
issue was discussed on a national level in the context of
post-war Germany. Therefore, it would be correct to claim
that this concept of “coming to terms with the past”
derived its roots from the specific context of the post-
war Germany (particularly Western Germany), when the
period of coping with the destruction of the Nazi era was
at its peak. It is still not known today who first coined
this term and exactly when it was used. However, it could
be said that there is a proof that this concept was used
in a conference arranged by Evangelische Akademie in
Berlin, in the year 1955 (Sancar, 2007, p. 26). There are
also records proving that the first president of the
Federal Republic of Germany in the post-war era, Theodor
Heuss, used the concept of “coming to terms with the
past” (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) in several of his
speeches that he delivered after the second half of the
1950s, and that he had a contribution in the spreading of
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the concept (Sancar, 2007, p. 26). Perhaps, owing to the
fact that the concept was coined in the very specific
context of Germany, it can be thought to be typically
German, and this is the reason why it is so difficult to
translate this term to the other languages.
As mentioned above, the concept acquired a global
perspective after the 1980s, when the act of coping with
the past came on the stage once more, and when it was
considered to be a serious matter how some nations,
having experienced dictatorships, domestic turmoil,
violation of human rights, could cope with their pasts,
and reconcile with their present day in order to re-build
the society basing the foundations on peace, democratic
values and human rights. Of course, as it can be
imagined, it was not easy to re-constitute a society
which espoused a political culture based on peace, and at
the time those were already problematic questions on a
global perspective how to manage that issue. Today the
matter of “coping with the past” is regarded as one major
part of the whole big issue of the collective memory.
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3.4. Alternative Terms for the Concept of Coming to Terms
with the Past
There are terms that can be alternative to the concept of
coming to terms with the past. As Sancar (2007) also
noted, “relationship to the past” (Umgang mit der
Vergangenheit), “politics of the past”
(Vergangenheitspolitik), “operating with the past”
(Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit) and “the remembering
culture” (Erinnerungskultur) were only some of those
terms offered to be alternatives to the concept (Sancar,
2007, p. 28). However, none of these terms were able to
replace or substitute the concept of “coming to terms
with the past,” because of the fact that the suggested
alternatives do not include any kind of a normative
statement, but rather they sound –are– neutral and
impartial. In contrast to the neutrality of its
alternatives, “coming to terms with the past” is rather a
normative one; it gives one the impression that the
subject matter is quite negative. Of course, it should
also be admitted that all these offered terms have
something to do with revealing what really happened in
the past and with representing the will to know more
about the past experiences and events.
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As for the concept “coming to terms with the past,” it
could be argued that the term includes many more other
meanings, as well as embracing the content of all the
other alternative terms. The act of coming to terms with
the past could be interpreted to be harboring denotations
such as having the courage to face the past, make
discussions on it openly and critically, being able to
accept the outcomes of what has been revealed out of the
discussions, making settlings on the political and
forensic arenas, punishing the perpetrators as well as
compensating the needs of the victims… so on and so forth
(Sancar, 2007, p. 30). Furthermore, it can also be argued
that the concept of coming to terms with the past
represents rather a continuous act buttressed by a strong
will power, and the desire to remember the past (Sancar,
2007, pp. 31-32). Therefore, it is possible to come up
with the conclusion that all the other terms and concepts
offered as an alternative to the concept “coming to terms
with the past” can be considered to be the ways that
would lead one at the end to come to terms with the past.
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3.5. The Discussions on Collective Crime and Traumatic
Memory
It could be argued that within societies that have
traumatic events in their pasts, which could be regarded
as a crime, most of the time the dominant attitude is to
deny the whole event and ignore coming to terms with it
instead of finding ways to face the reality and cope with
it.  However, this approach causes the crime to become
collective and has an implication posting that the guilt
has been shouldered by the whole society, regardless who
the real perpetrators are. Briefly, the very act of
coming to terms with the past makes it possible that the
crime is not a collective burden any more for the current
and coming generations (Sancar, 2007, p. 145).  In other
words, denying the traumatic event and not being willing
to deal with it results – such as punishing the
perpetrators, curing the victims…etc. – implies that the
society is cooperating with the offenders of that
specific event. Therefore, members of the society become
offenders themselves indirectly.  “Acting with a
continuous solidarity with perpetrators means to shoulder
a crime which one has not committed in person“ (Sancar,
2007, p. 146).
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When the concept of “collective crime/guilt” is
mentioned, some think of a case where the crime descends
from father to the son; from one generation to the next
one, only because of carrying the same genes of, or being
a member of the very society that formerly committed to
the crime.  However, the factor that bears the collective
guilt cannot be described or identified like a sickness
that is carried for generations. The real significant
factor that creates or prevents the collective guilt is
the attitude and approach of the next generations towards
the crime in the past and their decisions on how to
handle it (Sancar, 2007, p. 147). It should also be
underlined that the true aim of a society for dealing
with the past is not to convict the public body or the
whole nation, because it does not bring along any
concrete result that would cure the wounds of victims and
that would prevent that a similar kind of action happens
again. As emphasized by Sancar, the essence of learning
to deal with the past is to eliminate the ingrained and
institutionalized mentality that legitimizes massacres,
crimes and murders (2007, p. 147).
A traumatic event is most of the time a large process
that evolves in time. Jenny Edkins (2003) provides an
example for this issue from the topic of Nazi genocide of
the 1940s. Edkins states that the genocide matter and the
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survivors of the event were largely ignored at the
beginning until it became a topic of fascination (Edkins,
2003, p. 2). It is clear that crime and violence victims
as individuals and/or communities suffer from the
traumatic events in their pasts. The way a society –
regardless of its position as offender or sufferer –
chooses to deal with the past would bring along different
consequences in different time periods and change the
historical perspective and shape the future of that
society.  Owing to this fact, collective trauma and
collective memory are closely related to each other
(Sancar, 2007, p. 150). This close relationship can
definitely be observed in the example of the Nazi
genocide of the 1940s, owing to the fact that the event
changed the perception of the collective identities of
the two different groups involved in the traumatic event;
Jews as the victims and Germans as the perpetrators. Both
groups suffer from the traumatic impacts of the event;
Jews experience the victim/ sufferer trauma and Germans
suffer as a result of being the reason and offenders.
This impact of trauma is a phenomenon that soaked into
the identities. (Sancar, 2007, p. 149)
As expressed above, the social recognition of traumatic
events, like mentioned for the recognition of the 1940s
Nazi genocide, is a long process and it takes time until
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offenders and victims can start voicing themselves and
discuss the traumatic event with some certain
recognition. This issue could also be applied to the
traumatic event, 12 September, in Turkish history.
However, it should also be noted that in 12 September
event, being different from the Nazi genocide, the
offenders and the victims are members of the same
society, meaning the sense of belongingness is stronger
in the case of the 12 September victims and offenders, in
terms of common history, language and religion. It could
be argued that this fact, the offenders and the victims
being from the same society makes the social recognition
process even longer, owing to the fact that the feeling
of betrayal is even heavier within the same society than
that of between different groups.
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4. THE CONCEPT OF TRAUMA AND TRAUMA ANALYSIS IN
CINEMA
4.1. From Individual Trauma to Collective Trauma
The concept of trauma is applied primarily to
extraordinary experiences in the personal life of
individuals. Trauma involves an element of shock,
such as the shock of being stunned by a bee,
touching a live electrical wire, undergoing surgery,
or being in a serious automobile accident (Neal,
1988, p. 3).
As it can also be understood from the cases Arthur G.
Neal (1988) chose to clarify the concept of trauma, the
essence of trauma is hidden within the fact that “an
ongoing activity has been interrupted by an adverse
happening that is unexpected painful, extraordinary, and
shocking“ (p. 3). With these qualifications, it could be
deduced that a trauma always involves a radical change
75
that happens instantaneously; it could simply be said
that a fracture occurs in the lives of people. It would
not be surprising to recognize the fact that traumas
brought along by these radical instantaneous changes also
themselves bring along some radical consequences such as
the destruction or loss of the previous feelings of
safety and security, and acquiring of perceptions of
danger, chaos and a conjuncture in embarking the oncoming
events with meanings.
The rape victim becomes traumatized through a
diminished sense of social value and personal
integrity. The person diagnosed as having the AIDS
virus is traumatized by the isolating effects of the
disease and by the reduced opportunity for living a
normal life. Such traumas are frequently of
sufficient magnitude that the individual feels that
he or she has become ‘damaged’ or permanently changed
(Neal, 1988, p. 3).
As it could be clearly seen through the help of the
examples suggested above, for the victims of trauma,
things would never be in the same order as they used to
be before that traumatic experience took place. The
following definition of trauma made by Laplanche and
Pontalis (1967) and quoted by Janet Walker (2001) seems
to be very well recapitulating the concept:  “Trauma
(Psychical): An event in the subject’s life defined by
its intensity, by the subject’s incapacity to respond
adequately to it, and by the upheaval and long-lasting
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effects that it brings about in the psychical
organization“ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967, p. 465). It
could also be argued that it is also important to
recognize by whom the traumatic situation is created and
enforced, as well as to recognize what kind of a
traumatic event came about. Edkins (2003) stated in her
book that the very event of trauma appears when one’s
feelings of security are damaged by those who are
supposed to provide it.
…what we call trauma takes place when the very powers
that we are convinced will protect us and give us
security become our tormentors: when the community of
which we considered ourselves members turns against
us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge
but a site of danger (p. 4).
According to the statements of Edkins (2003) considering
a traumatic event, as it is observed, it is also
significant to define the source of the trauma.
The concept of trauma refers to the abrupt changes in the
qualities of social relationships on a group level as
well as on an individual level. It could be argued that
the debut and the consequences of individual and
national/collective traumas resemble each other a lot in
the sense that both of the two types are resulted from
abrupt radical changes and that they both bring about
fundamental changes in the lives of people; “just as the
rape victim becomes permanently changed as a result of
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the trauma, the nation becomes permanently changed as a
result of a trauma in the social realm“ (Neal, 1988, p.
4). Fear, disbelief, vulnerability and incredulity become
the indispensable social values.
Neal (1988) argues that there are two different types of
national/collective traumas; the first of which is a kind
of social trauma that comes all of a sudden and that
“consists of an acute crisis that impinges upon the
normal course of events in an abrupt and dramatic
fashion” by destroying the harmony and the order of the
social system due to the fact that it is an unscheduled
event (p. 7). The second kind of collective trauma is
described by Neal as a type of social crisis that lasts
long and that has become chronic, and that “lacks the
dramatic beginning of an acute crisis, but builds in
intensity with the passing of time“ (Neal, 1988, p. 7).
The Great Depression in America during the 1930s could be
regarded as a good example for a chronic crisis in the
social realm, because of the fact that the peak of the
crisis was not acquired over night, but rather it was the
consequence of a process starting in the 1929, with the
crash of the stock market. However, that event itself was
not the national/collective trauma itself. The real
social trauma took place when economic hardships loomed
large on all the major sectors of the economy and when
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levels of unemployment escalated drastically in the
1930s. This economic crisis brought along worries about
the current and future state of the social welfare, and
it created fear and vulnerability, which were engraved
into the consciousness of members of the society (Neal,
1988, p. 8).
4.2. 12 September as a Chronic Crisis in the Turkish
Social Realm
It would not be wrong to claim that, perhaps the 12
September military coup can similarly be regarded as a
chronic crisis in the Turkish social realm. It could be
perceived that the 12 September came as a dramatic abrupt
event that came over night, impinged upon the normal
course of the events and eventually imprinted on the
consciousness of the entire society. However, as
discussed in the first chapter, the 12 September was, or
perhaps has been, a product of a process and it turned
out to be the peak of a social crisis which later dragged
the society in a different rotation and which had a
contribution in the formation of the oncoming
generations, portioning them fear, vulnerability and a
sense of despair; therefore having vital contributions
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into the formation and/or shaping of the collective
memory. As the scholars James W. Pennebaker and Becky L.
Banasik (1997) also underlined “collective memories are
most likely to be formed and maintained about events that
represent significant long-term effects“ (p. 17). To
clarify the situation in other words, the social context
surrounding the people, to which they were supposed to be
bound with the feelings of belonging and placement, was
not a safe milieu anymore for the inhabitants of this
very social text to survive and proceed their lives.
Edkins (2003) explained how this situation could harm
one’s profound relationship with his/her social context.
This can be devastating because who we are, or who we
think we may be, depends very closely on the social
context in which we place and find ourselves. Our
existence relies not only on our personal survival as
individual beings but also, in a very profound sense,
on the continuance of the social order that gives our
existence meaning and dignity: family, friends,
political community, beliefs. If that order betrays
us in some way, we may survive in the sense of
continuing to live as physical beings, but the
meaning of our existence is changed… Any illusion of
safety or security is broken (Edkins, 2003, p. 4).
 It would be correct to argue that 12 September (1980)
reflects a dark time period in Turkish history, which
reminds its victims and witnesses of inauspicious
memories each time it is mentioned. The 12 September
military coup and the period before it (particularly
1975-1980), which laid the ground work for the event,
involved the most prominent symptoms proving that a civil
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war was going on in Turkey. There was news on people
dying everyday, and the bullet together with bomb noises
were justifying the reason why the chaotic atmosphere in
the country was reflecting to the people. The society was
in a deep anxiety about its future (Kanbur, 2005, p. 56).
Sancar (2007) stresses that, a society just like an
individual, would react in several different ways when
exposed to a traumatic event. He sums these different
reactions in two main oppositional categories: 1. To deny
the traumatic event and avoid talking on it, or 2. to
accept the traumatic event and try to face it (Sancar,
2007, p. 150). This is called the “central dialectic” of
trauma12.
Perhaps these all explain why people avoid talking about
it, let alone making a critique or analysis of the event.
The victims and witnesses avoid “amending the damage
caused by the 12 September, and self-critique“ (Laçiner,
2000, p. 3). Thus, it becomes more and more practically
impossible to face the past and make a peace with it,
which we defined as to “come to terms with the past.”
However, the fact should be considered that trauma is not
a one-time occurrence, but a process consisting of
12 For futher information please see Judith Herman (1993). Die
narben der gewalt (The trauma caused by violence). Munich:
Kindler.
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different phases; therefore one should always take into
account that it may take a long time until the trauma
victim gets involved in the purposeful remembering action
and becomes able to talk about the event, in order to be
transmitted in the curing phase (Sancar, 2007, p. 150-
151).
4.3. Trauma Cinema: The Characteristics of the Genre and
How Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum Fit in it
The essence of the trauma is precisely that it is too
horrible to be remembered, to be integrated into our
symbolic universe. All we have to do is to mark
repeatedly the trauma as such (Zizek, 1991, p. 1).
Walker (2001) claimed that 1980s and 1990s could be
claimed to have witnessed the development of a ‘trauma
cinema,’ (p. 214). She also emphasized that she referred
to a group of films that treats destructive past events,
such as experiencing or witnessing military combat,
violent personal assault, terrorist attack, torture, so
on and so forth, on an individual or a social level, or
both of the mentioned. Walker said the films which one
could categorize as trauma films “were characterized by
non-linearity, fragmentation, nonsynchronous sound,
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repetition, rapid editing and strange angles“ (2001, p.
214).
In the films Beynelmilel (Sırrı Süreyya Önder and
Muharrem Gülmez 2006) and Babam ve Oğlum (Çağan Irmak
2005) the 12 September military coup can also be observed
to be a dramatic event that changed the destinies of
people. This is why it has been assumed that they would
make good examples in the context mentioned and why they
have been chosen. However, the films do not handle the
very day of the 12 September, but rather they deal with
the world-shattering events that came afterwards. One may
think that the film Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum do not
exactly and absolutely fit in the category of the trauma
films, by considering the borders of Walker’s definition
on the phenomenon, such as the film does not involve any
fragmentation, repetition, rapid editing or strange
angles. However, I would like to argue that what the main
characters of the film, particularly, Gülendam and Sadik,
both being people from a small town who are involved in
politics around the 1980s for different reasons (Sadık is
actively involved in politics whereas Gülendam just reads
communist manifesto books so as to satisfy her lover who
is a studied person), experience throughout the films,
and/or especially at the end of the films, could be
considered to be providing good examples for individual
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trauma and how individual traumas pile up and in the end
turn out to be the experience of the entire society as a
collective/national trauma; therefore contributing into
the formation of collective memory.
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5. BEYNELMİLEL AND BABAM VE OĞLUM AS 12 SEPTEMBER
FILMS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF TRAUMA CINEMA
Regular memory is defined as an act of story telling.
Traumatic memory, on the contrary, is non-verbal and
fixed (Herman, 2007, p. 227).
5.1. Beynelmilel
Beynelmilel is a Turkish film made in the year 2006, and
directed by Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Muharrem Gülmez. It
could be discussed whether or not it is possible to make
a separate category out of the Turkish films and collect
them under the title of “the 12 September Films;” however
if it is proved that such a category exists, then one can
definitely analyze Beynelmilel under this specific
85
category owing to several reasons which will be discussed
and studied below.
Beynelmilel has been criticized by some film scholars and
academicians on the ground that it represents a love
story and overshadows the 12 September military coup by
using it just a background for time and setting. In other
words, the subject matter of 12 September has been wasted
around the love plot and has lost its credibility and
estranged itself from its authenticity. According to Oğuz
Adanır, this has been the case in all popular Turkish
films (1994, p. 152).
At the conference titled as “Cinema and Politics”
organized at the Kadir Has University (İstanbul) in 2007,
one of the directors of the film, Sırrı Süreyya Önder,
stressed that he and his crew did not intend to make a
film of the 12 September military coup in particular
(Doğruöz, 2007, p. 77). Önder emphasized that they wanted
to make the first anti-militarist film in Turkey,
criticizing the military logic and showing the results of
its being imposed in the social life. Considering the
director’s statements, it could be argued the film
Beynelmilel does not aim at a particular critique of the
12 September but, rather it intends to criticize the very
core of the narrow-minded military logic (Doğruöz, 2007,
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p. 77). However, it would not be wrong to argue that the
aim of making a critique of the military logic could in
the end come to mean also having a critical view on the
12 September military takeover, because the event is by
all means a product of the military which clearly
reflects the core of its logic and perception of
democracy. Therefore, it could also be arrogated that the
film Beynelmilel also critizies the very logic of the 12
September military coup. It should also be noted that the
director of the film, Sırrı Süreyya Önder is an
individual, who has experienced the 12 September military
coup and its aftermath. It could also be interpreted that
the director did not wish to talk about the event, or at
least escaped from the idea of making a discussion on it
in any way. However, his film Beynelmilel thematizing the
12 September event cannot be thought independent from his
traumatic experiences in those times, because the film is
a product of his mindset and perception of the world. It
could be claimed that the director Önder does a good job
in making the audience think while also getting them
laugh.
Beynelmilel deals with the tragicomic events that a group
of local musicians (gevende) goes through during the
martial law administration in the year 1982, in Adıyaman.
Owing to the military governance in the city, the
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military rules become dominant and it is forbidden to
arrange entertainment activities and parties at night,
which also kills the social life. One day it is announced
that the council that did the military coup will come
visit Adıyaman. Upon this announcement start the
tragicomic events. The authorized military group in the
city decides to create a modern and westernized orchestra
out of the local musicians in order to be able to
arrange a sophisticated welcoming ceremony for the
military council. The local musicians are then made to
leave their music instruments such as drums, violins and
clarinets; and to wear military uniforms of French
soldiers (which they normally use for theatrical
performance organized in the name of Adıyaman’s
liberation day) so as to look harmonious and in unity.
They take up the modern westernized music instruments and
start their new job, by practicing field music, although
they are not trained for it. It could be argued that this
very scene provides a very good example of how the
Kemalism principles have been imposed on people/ the
society in the name of modernization and westernization
of the country. It is practically an outstanding detail
that the local gevende musicians are made to wear soldier
uniforms to look orderly and appropriate according to the
understanding and perception of the military authorities,
because it evidently depicts the audience how
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modernization took place in Turkey “without relying on
the domestic dynamics but relying totally on external
compulsion; starting from the state and descending from
the state to the society” (Laçiner, 2002, p. 11).
However, the poor musicians are unaware of the fact that
their tragic end is coming closer when Abuzer, one of the
main characters in the film as the chef of the new
orchestra, decides to play the “Internationale”13 for the
visiting military council, which he heard while his
daughter Gülendam was listening to it. To the audience’s
surprise, the authorized local military group never
understands what the new orchestra is preparing for the
council. However, on the day of the welcoming ceremony,
it becomes clear what the musicians are playing as a
march and they are put in prison for playing the
“Internationale.” During the clutter and disturbance at
the ceremony the guns are fired and Haydar, the young
university student whom Gülendam is in love with, is shot
dead. The film ends ironically with an ellipsis to the
present time, with the scene where we see Gülendam and
her daughter watching the “Internationale” being played
on television.
13 The “Internationale” (L’internationale in French) is a worldwide
known communist anthem also recognized by socialists, social-
democrats as well as anarchists. The original French lyrics of the
anthem were written by Eugene Pottier in 1871. The
“Internationale” was sung as the national anthem of the Soviet
Union between the years 1922-1944.
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There could be important aspects to discuss in the
context of trauma cinema considering what happened to
Gülendam at the end of the film; Haydar, whom she was in
love with, was shot by the police in the chaotic
atmosphere of the welcoming ceremony. Not only that, but
also her father was taken into custody and the audience
was somewhat oriented to deduce from that Gülendam’s
father lost his life during the torture sessions when he
was being questioned on how he learnt to play the
“Internationale,” and whether or not he was amongst a
group of socialist people who were planning to offend the
Committee by their protest. As it can be seen, in each
case Gülendam ended up losing something; the people whom
she loved so much. Maureen Turim (2001) mentions Freud’s
treatment of the traumatic event, and she underlined the
fact that all forms of loss, such circumstances as “death
of a love object, betrayal, rape and dismemberment” could
cause serious injuries to the psyche (p. 206). To put it
in Freudian terms: “Loss of love plays much the same part
in hysteria as the threat of castration does in phobias
and fear of the superego in obsessional neurosis” (Freud,
1986 [1926], p. 143). Considering this approach of Freud
and the interpretations of Turim on this specific issue,
one can evidently recognize Gülendam, the main character
of the film Beynelmilel also received a cardinal wound in
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her psyche, having lost both her beloved lover and her
father.
Furthermore, especially considering the ending of the
film, the audience again may think that Gülendam feels
guilty because clearly she has been the reason why her
father has learnt the song “Internationale” and played it
for the Committee. Considering these issues, one may take
up the discussions “Who is held guilty and who has to pay
for it, and who takes the responsibility?” One may think
that Gülendam, as one individual of the society had to
pay for everything as it was her own fault what was
happening. Therefore, a person making that argument could
also state that the film Beynelmilel lacks questioning
and criticizing the whole system with its shortcomings
and limitations, what really took place those days, but
rather it accuses one single individual as a result of
her actions. However, it should also be noted that seeing
the situation the other way around is also possible,
meaning Beynelmilel could also be thought to be
ironically criticizing the general inclination to create
guilt complex for individuals which prevents or detains
the critiques on a larger scale.
Another point to be made is that whether or not the
individual in the film shoulders the guilt or somehow or
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other made to accept the infraction. It also has to be
noted at this point that the kind of guilt complex
Gülendam faces cannot be regarded as a social guilt, but
we can say rather it is an individual emotional guilt.
She may feel guilty and regret that she has not told her
father what the song “Internationale” really means and
for which groups it has been given different meanings. In
that sense it can be said that emotional guilt is based
upon self-blame.
Another important element to be underlined about the film
Beynelmilel is brought along with the very ending of the
film, where with a flash-forward the audience views
Gülendam and her daughter watching the song
“Internationale” played by the Alexandrov Ensemble, the
official army choir of the Russian armed forces, on
television. When confronted by her little daughter with
the question what that is shown on TV at that moment,
Gülendam answers her by saying that is the composition of
her father, Abuzer. Some viewers perhaps think that
Gülendam’s daughter is yet too young to hear the bitter
truth about the song played on TV, and this could seem to
be justifying the reason why Gülendam prefers to tell her
daughter a white lie. However it could also be argued
that the audience is oriented to think that what Gülendam
tells her daughter as a white lie will be the very final
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sentence about that topic, and the impression is given
that it will always remain as a big secret what the song
“Internationale” really means to Gülendam, and no other
word will be spoken further on the subject matter. This
attitude of Gülendam could also be associated with the
fear of communism brought along from the 1980s and
perpetuated all through the 1990s, and even today. All in
all, in other words, the situation here experienced by
Gülendam turns out to be an “unspeakable” one, because
Gülendam, the innocent young girl of the 1980s, who did
not have much opinion about the world and the domestic
politics, and read books and texts from the socialist
theory just to find favor in her intellectual lover’s
eyes, now feels that she has been betrayed by the social
surrounding which she trusted so much, and she has been
forced to learn the grave truth about the world not from
the books but by experiencing harsh events. The character
Gülendam whom the audience views shortly at the end of
the film is no longer the same Gülendam the audience has
viewed at the very beginning of the film, just like the
anthem “Internationale” does not have the same
connotations for the audience as it has had in the
beginning of the film. As Edkins puts it:
…In what we call a traumatic event… we can no longer
be who we were, and the social context is not what we
assumed it to be. It is not all powerful; it does not
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have all the answers: in fact its answers are flawed…
Of course, the language we speak is part of the
social order, and when the order falls apart around
our ears, so does the language. What we can say no
longer makes sense; what we want to say we cannot.
There are no words for it (2003, p. 8).
5.2. Babam ve Oğlum
Babam ve Oğlum is a film made by Çağan Irmak in 2005. By
using the 12 September Turkish Military Coup as the
background, the film tells audience the dramatic story of
a father, Sadık, and his son, Deniz whose point of view
leads the audience throughout the film. The film opens
with the scene where Sadık, comes home being drunk and is
reproached for coming back home at such a late time by
his pregnant wife whose big belly gives the impression
that her delivery is really close. In the morning of that
night Sadık`s wife travails heavily and the couple rush
out to go to the hospital. However they cannot find any
means of transportation owing to the curfew order that
brought along with the 12 September military coupe that
took place on the very night. The only joyful event
taking place on that night seems to be the fact that
Sadık`s son, Deniz, manages to survive the unfortunate
night. However, even the birth of his son cannot make
Sadık a happy father, because from this point on the
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dramatic developments start for him. Regrettably, Sadık
loses his wife owing to the inappropriate delivery
conditions on the street and to the excessive loss of
blood. Not only this tragic loss, but also due to his
political standing and identity during the 70s, the days
of prison and torture now wait for Sadık, while some
relatives are taking care of his son. Having come out of
the prison, Sadık sadly realizes that he is incurably
sick. Upon this bad news, Sadık makes up his mind to go
back to the farm of his family on the Aegean coast which
he abandoned years ago in order to be able to study at a
good university and to get involved with politics
actively in a big city. Throughout the film audience is
invited to view the experiences of the father and the son
on that family farm with its colorful residents; how the
new comers try to renew their bonds with the grandfather
with whom Sadık is cross with since he has left home to
go involved with politics, and how Sadık slowly manages
to get Deniz used to living on that farm when he cannot
be there for him anymore.  Unfortunately the tragic end
comes and gives the family a big deep shock with the
death of Sadık.
It could be claimed that Babam ve Oğlum is one of those
controversial films, just like Beynelmilel, on which
there have been strong discussion whether or not they
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belong to the category of 12 September films. For
instance, Hilmi Maktav (2006) criticizes the film Babam
ve Oğlum for having “succeeded” to make a film on the 12
September military coup without getting the military
involved in it, and without even mentioning the word
“putsch” in it, apart from one little scene where a
soldier explains Sadık, the main character of the film,
why no transportation vehicle is available on the street.
Maktav emphasizes that it is certainly left in suspense
by whom and why the coup has been staged. Furthermore, he
stresses, the audience did not even realize that the
tragic events happened as a result of the military coup.
It could be claimed that the most significant critique of
Maktav on Çağan Irmak’s Babam ve Oğlum is that Maktav
accuses the director –who already claimed he did not
intend to make a political film, but the whole effort was
to tell a “story” - of having transmitted an indirect
political message by claiming it is a big mistake of
people to leave their families in order to pursue their
social ideals and aspirations, and the real happiness
only comes when one is in homeland with the family, which
can be interpreted in the end to be promoting
depoliticization (Maktav, 2006, Vatan, Millet, Sinema
(Homeland, Nation, Cinema), para. 33).
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In his article where he discusses the reflections of
September 12 in the films made after the year 2000, Hakan
Şükrü Doğruöz (2007) comments on the film Babam Ve Oğlum
for being unique with its critique on the 12 September
military coup, and for using the socio-political of the
1980s purely as a background to his story, which
thematizes the hostility between a father and a son. He
argues that “the film does not tell the audience anything
else about the 12 September than short torture scenes
appearing a couple of times, a death (the death of
Sadık’s wife) caused by the curfew order, and as a result
a family falling apart“ (Doğruöz, 2007, p. 75). Doğruöz
also claims that it is not even clear in the film why the
main character has to be put in prison (p. 75).
On the other hand, Doğruöz (2007) also mentions the
assumption – originally put forward by Thomas Elsaesser
(2002), the international film historian – that
excessively sentimental melodramatic films such as Babam
ve Oğlum can have one positive effect on the audience:
Such films can help people, particularly the victims
survived the 12 September, to face their sorrows and
mourn on them14. Freud (1972 [1917]) also supported the
14
 For a detailed reading, please see Elsaesser, T. (2002). One
train may be hiding another: History, memory, identity, and the
visual image. In L. Belau and P. Ramadanovic (Ed.), Topologies
of trauma: Essays on the limit of knowledge and memory (pp. 61-
71). New York: Other Press.
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same idea by claiming that individuals having experienced
traumatic events can only show strength to live the
current day only if the process of mourning and
melancholy (trauerarbeit) has successfully been
performed15. The reason why this action of being grieved
could help the audience is the idea that it offers a way
for them to cope with their trauma (Doğruöz, 2007, p.
71).
5.3. The Comparison of Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum in
the Context of Trauma Cinema
The films Babam ve Oğlum and Beynelmilel, which have been
introduced above and discussed in the context of trauma
cinema, could be compared in several aspects such as both
including crypto or direct torture scenes by using
prisons and jails as the setting, posting the torturers
to be soldiers as the repressive state apparatus and
having male characters who are seemingly politicized
intellectuals caring about Turkey’s future; therefore
suffering from it, whereas the female characters in the
15
 For futher information please see Freud, S. (1972 [1917]).
Mourning and Melancholia. New Jersey: Sharp & Dohme.
98
two films only suffer from the 12 September event
indirectly; at the emotional level rather than for
political reasons. However, other similar aspects will be
compared below, which are thought to be providing a
better harmony within the whole research.
It would not be wrong to claim that both films hold the
distinction of carrying melodramatic features owing to
their interconnected family members and the setting
defined as small towns.  Both films have a traditional
stereotypical father characters in them, who would like
to decide for everybody in the family.  Another analogy
that could be built between the two films is the fact
that in both of the films there are main characters that
experience a loss of beloved person/persons. And last but
not least, in both Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum, the
main characters engrave their experiences and memories
left from the days following the 12 September socio-
political event as traumatic experiences, which leads
them to become spiritually dumb and muted.
It has to be firstly stated that both films bear the two
most prominent characteristics of melodrama, as defined
by Thomas Schatz (1981) to be melodrama’s narrative
formula: “interrelated family of characters” and
“repressive small town milieu“ (Schatz, 1981, p. 151). In
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both films audience views a chain of dramatic events
based on families living in small towns. “Melodrama tells
stories that are dwelled on ‘indoors’ (like in a house,
in a family) as a physical location,” says Suner (2002,
p. 190). The family in Beynelmilel lives in Adıyaman, a
south-eastern province, whereas the family in Babam ve
Oğlum lives in a small beach town nearby İzmir, called
Seferihisar. It could be said that the families that
appear in the mentioned films are traditional Turkish
families; meaning a large family consisting more than
four people live together in one big house. The positions
of the family members also represent the stereotypical
traditional extended family; the most outstanding figure
appearing to be the father. As identified by Nilgün
Abisel (1994), the father character is “the head of the
family and the one to use his authority… He appears with
an identity of a gentle and disciplinarian person, who
takes all the decisions so long as he stays alive“ (p.
80). It would not be wrong to claim that the father
figures in Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum considerable
overlap with the father definition of Abisel. The most
significant decision taken by the father characters
(Abuzer and Hüseyin) in the mentioned films on behalf of
their children (Gülendam and Sadık) is the same. Both
fathers would like to have their children away from the
political activism. It could be argued that Abuzer and
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Hüseyin take that decision for their children with the
protective instincts of a father, because for they
consider politics to involve anarchism and rebellion
against the state, conflicts, fights and even death. Both
fathers fear that their children would try to fight
against the dominant ideology and both are fearful that
they would be punished heavily for that. One can think
that the two fathers in the films could be tolerated when
read the following passage taken from Nilgün Toker
Kılınç:
With its success in eliminating the dissent, the 12
September has ‘taught’ the society to fear
opposition; the fear was so great that it eventually
eradicated the sense of being a dissenter. The most
functional method in internalizing this fear was to
give the message that being a dissenter would at the
same time mean violence, terrorism, dragon’s blood;
briefly social chaos (Kılınç, 2000, p. 109).
This is why, in one scene of Beynelmilel, Abuzer slaps
Gülendam in the face, and threatens her by denying her
filiations when she attempts to make semi-politic
speeches. Similarly, the father Hüseyin in Babam ve Oğlum
is offended by his son Sadık on the grounds that Sadık
left his hometown and went to İstanbul to get involved in
politics actively.  In this sense, both films dramatize
and reflect the tension arising as a result of the
conflict between the old and new life styles, which is an
element also highlighted in Peter Brooks’s definition of
melodrama (1976).
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Both in Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum, the main
characters as well as sub-characters suffer from
individual trauma by the loss of beloved persons,
therefore going through self-blame/guilt complex and by
the unspeakable disposition of the traumatic
situation/memory. Furthermore, another significant
similarity in these two films is that not only the
characters having relatively active connections to the 12
September events but, also the characters surrounding
them suffer badly from the impact of this socio-political
event; therefore the tragic experiences cannot be
explained with ordinary words, as Edkins (2003) also
highlighted in the following passage:
…what has happened is beyond the possibility of
communication. There is no language for it. Abuse by
the state, the fatherland, like abuse by the father
within the family, cannot be spoken in language,
since language comes from and belongs to the family
and the community (Edkins, 2003, p. 7).
Muteness is a theme occurs usually in Yeşilçam films made
in 1960s and 1970s, and in addition, in the films that
refer to those films in the following years. According to
Suner (2002), this physical handicap motive symbolizes
different things in Yeşilçam films and the referring
films. In one of her articles Suner argues that the
motive of muteness in Yeşilçam melodramas is
paradoxically a way of self-expression; meaning,
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“tragedies, love, devotion and self-sacrifice, that
cannot be expressed in direct language, are represented
throughout a film by that physical handicap“ (Suner,
2002, p. 194). However, in the films made after 1990s
(Suner exemplifies in particular the film called
Masumiyet by Demirkubuz) the theme of muteness acts as a
disclosure motive, representing the unspeakable
dispositions, characters withdrawn in themselves and the
absolute inefficiency of self-expression (Suner, 2002, p.
194).  At this point it would be relevant to argue that
the position of the “unspeakable,” taken by the
characters in the films Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum
(Gülendam and Sadık’s efforts and tendency to suppress
the past) is very similar to Suner’s analysis of muteness
motive, and they are major symptoms of traumatic
personalities. Of course, it should be noted that the
muteness motive in the films Beynelmilel and Babam ve
Oğlum is not a concrete but, an abstract one. All in all,
regardless of its being abstract, the muteness motive
stands for the introvertedness of the traumatic
characters that are also unable to face the reality, come
to terms with the past and question it.
In both Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum the main
characters Gülendam and Sadık experience a loss of
beloved person/persons. Gülendam in Beynelmilel loses her
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true love when he is shot by the police during the
chaotic atmosphere that breaks out at the ceremony. She
experiences the bitterness of sorrows and deep grief upon
her father’s being arrested and put in the prison.
Similarly, in the film Babam ve Oğlum, in the very first
scene Sadik loses his wife owing to lack of means to
reach the hospital; therefore the pregnant woman gives
birth on the street with the help of her husband.
Unfortunately she dies as a result of excessive blood
loss. The little boy Deniz manages to survive that
grieved night; however the curse of losing the beloved
persons continues and in the end of the film he loses his
father, too.
At this point it could also be argued that the positions
of Gülendam and Deniz differ from each other in the sense
that Gülendam has perhaps something to feel guilty of and
therefore, regret what has happened, because she has had
the chance to tell her father about the march music
“Internationale,” whereas Deniz is yet a very young boy
who has not done anything similar to what Gülendam has.
However, it should also be kept in mind that Gülendam is
not aware of the fact that her father likes the song
“Internationale” so much, and believes it to be the song
of the spring and decides to play it with his fellow
musicians for the council coming to visit them in their
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city. In this aspect, she cannot be considered to have
committed a crime being full purposefully, in spite of
the fact that it could be assumed that she suffers from
guilt complex and self-blame in the following years.
It should also be noted that there is another very
important character in Babam ve Oğlum apart from Sadık
and Deniz; and that is Sadık’s father called Hüseyin with
whom Sadık has come cross with owing to his doughty
aspiration and resolution of going to a big city in order
to study at the university and get involved actively in
politics. In short, Sadık has outlined his life in the
specific way he wants rather than following the wishes of
his father and pursuing the kind of career he constructed
for him.
It could be argued that one of the most tragic and
striking scenes of the film is the one where the father
Hüseyin stands in front of the gate of his farm, mourning
and lamenting for his dead son, pounding on his own chest
while crying out loud, “He died because of me! I have
killed him!” This very scene is like a vivid proof of the
fact that Hüseyin the father feels he is responsible of
what has happed to his son, Sadık, and therefore he is
the one to blame for his death. This guilt complex and
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self-blame of Hüseyin is already familiar to us owing to
Gülendam who has been introduced and studied above.
It can be stated that the main characters in the film,
Sadik in Babam ve Oğlum and Gülendam in Beynelmilel, are
being forced “by themselves” not to think about the
traumatic experiences they as well as their families and
beloved persons go through in the period following the 12
September, because they would like to completely forget
about it. However, the case fires back; meaning as
strongly the characters try to forget about the events,
the more and deeper they are doomed to remember them and
have their bad memories engraved in their subconscious.
As Pennebaker and Banasik also underlined in their text:
When people do not want to or cannot openly talk
about an important event, they continue to think and
even dream about it… Ironically then, actively trying
not to think about an event can contribute to a
collective memory in ways that may be as powerful if
not so than events that are openly discussed
(Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997, p. 11).
According to Pennebaker and Banasik (1997), silent events
and the unspeakable disposition of traumatic events are
more deeply embedded in individual memories. The two
scholars stated that studies have shown that suppression
of unfavorable thoughts and experiences is quite
unlikely. They quoted an instance from Wegner’s study in
1989, in which he argued that people being told to avoid
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thinking of an object attempted to think about that
specific object as subsequently as those who are
explicitly told to contrive about it16. That is to say,
“in short, when people are told to avoid talking or even
thinking about an important event, that event becomes
more deeply ingrained memory“ (Pennebaker & Banasik,
1997, p. 10). Futhermore, it could be argued that in both
Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum, both main characters
Gülendam and Sadık try to escape from the locations where
they have gone through the most unfavorable periods of
their lives during the aftermath of the 12 September
military coup, which could be regarded as proofs
justifying that they do want to forget about the past and
the traumatic event. However the more they escape, the
more they would get into the trap of the past. “You can
take a Chinese girl out of her Chinese quarter but, you
cannot take the Chinese quarter out of the girl“ (the
director Wang, qtd. in Suner, 2002, p. 177) says one of
the characters in the film Dim Sum (a film thematizing
the life of Chinese immigrants in 1985, made by Wayne
Wang), which falls very appropriate in the current
discussion context.
16
 For further information see Wegner, D. M. (1989). White
bears and other unwanted thoughts. New York: Viking.
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It should also be noted at this point that the
suppression and/or inhibition of the traumatic experience
is not only enforced by the inner self but, also by some
political powers and ideologies. Ömer Laçiner (1990), the
chief editor of the monthly journal Birikim and also a
socialist author, argues that the governments that came
to power after the 12 September military coup and the
military itself have used this traumatic socio-political
event as a strategy quite often. That is to mean, the
period before and after the event have been defined by
the ideological powers as a state of insanity, which has
to be buried in the past and not remembered at all
(Laçiner, 1990, p. 4). It could be argued that it has the
same effect on individual subconscious, in that
suppression gives rise to the engraving of the bad
memories. However, somehow different from the suppression
practiced by the inner self, ideological repressions
would add to the acquisition and shaping of the
collective memory more effectively. Pennebaker and
Banasik also emphasize this assumption in the following
passage:
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Emotionally charged events about which people
actively avoid talking will continue to affect
individuals by increasing their rate of thinking and
dreaming about the events. Political repression of
speech about an occurrence, then, will have the
unintended consequence of consolidating collective
memories associated with the repressed event
(Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997, p. 17).
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6. CONCLUSION
The 12 September military coup has certainly been a
traumatic socio-political experience in Turkish history,
and it has had uncountable impacts and influences on
social, political and economic life of Turkish society.
As underlined by Cüneyt Arcayürek (1990):
…the military interventions have appalled the state
entirely. It has weakened the faith of the society in
the regime, government and in their own rights. It
has caused inequalities and injustice and has created
an atmosphere of anxiety and fear… This has to be
called the shock impact of the interventions
(Arcayürek, 1990, p. 521).
As the military would have also concluded as a result of
the military takeover of the 1980, “anarchy, terror,
demolition and separatism have been suppressed; but it
became only possible through also the suppression of
democracy. This is the price the society had to pay”
(Arcayürek, 1990, 523). Each member of Turkish society
could be seen as a victim of the traumatic event, because
110
the perpetrators have not been objectively judged and
brought in front of the court. This experience is a big
process, and the society continues bearing its products
in all possible fields of life, including cinema. As long
as the trauma of the 12 September is not recognized and
confirmed by the society itself, the analysis and
observations are doomed to remain as individual endeavors
and experiences.
Both Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum have been criticized
by some film critiques and academics for not having been
able to tell the real story of the 12 September military
coup in Turkey. However, this critique would not be
enough to drive a conclusion about the two films, as it
will be expanded below.
These negative discussions on Beynelmilel and Babam ve
Oğlum mainly result from the fact that both films carry
melodramatic features as the dominant filmic character.
That is to say, the two films primarily focus on the
individual and/or familial experiences of the film
characters and use the 12 September only as a background
time or setting in which the stories take place rather
than dealing with the traumatic socio-political event
itself. Therefore, many believe that Beynelmilel and
Babam ve Oğlum have failed to make an appropriate
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critique of the perpetrators of the event, and to make an
objective analysis, which is anticipated to bring along
the most possible favored result of coming to terms with
the past.
Particularly the pseudo-happiness or, at least, feelings
of relief reflected in the ending of the films -such as
children growing and remembering only as a childhood
memory what happened to them an to their family at that
specific time period in the past, founding one’s own
family (like it is the case in Beynelmilel) and children
taken under the wings of family members of secondary
kinship (as it is the case in Babam ve Oğlum) are
criticized to give audience the impression that all the
tragic and traumatic events are left in the past, at the
time they happened; therefore one should think about the
future that is coming with all its hopes, instead of
focusing on the problems which occurred in the past, and
have not been solved yet. The 12 September has been
locked away into the past with the endings of the films;
thus the perpetrators can remain obscure. This is perhaps
caused by the very nature of the melodrama, where the
audience expects a comforting end.
E. Ann Kaplan (2001) also brings along this issue and
claims that in trauma films bearing melodramatic
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features, the audience is “positioned” and interpellated
in a certain way, which would perhaps activate their
empathetical or ethical feelings, yet, would not include
any potentially negative results which would terrify them
and make them lose hopes about the future (p. 204).
Kaplan stresses:
…in melodrama, the spectator is introduced to trauma
through a film’s themes and techniques, but the film
ends with a comforting closure or ‘cure.’ Such
mainstream works posit trauma (against its reality)
as a discrete past event, locatable, representable
and curable (p. 204).
However, it should be noted at this point that the trauma
representation is also already a problematic issue,
particularly when the genre is melodrama and/or a comedy
owing to the fact that those genres mostly require a
comforting end (Kaplan, 2001, p. 204) or rendering
certain situations humorous and funny; therefore
justifying the prerequisites of the traumatic event
thematized in the film, by making it into something
laughable (Zizek, 1999, Laugh Yourself to Death: The New
Wave of Holocaust Comedies, para. 8 & 9). Furthermore,
the category of 12 September films is yet an unclear
issue. Besides, film critics, who has made a critique
about Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum and claimed that
these films do not fulfill the requirements of a good 12
September film, have themselves never defined what a good
12 September film should be like, and what it should
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include or exclude. It would not be wrong to argue that
the critiques about Beynelmilel and particularly Babam ve
Oğlum have remained on the level of “how a 12 September
should not be.” This situation should not be depreciated,
though, because they certainly create a cinematic field
for the discussion of trauma; therefore they should also
be paid attention and analyzed to contribute into the
studies in this field. In this sense, revealing and
analyzing the unfavored characteristics of a real 12
September film should also be appreciated, because it may
possibly lead to the discovery of a clearer, more visible
and explicit definition for the “12 September films” as a
separate category. Kaplan states:
Trauma can be approached (if not known) only through
its figuration by either its victim, by those
witnessing it, or by artists undertaking its telling.
Forms such as cinema may be especially appropriate to
figuring the visual, aural and non-linear fragmented
phenomena of trauma-to performing it. Trauma analysis
aims to distinguish and understand trauma landscapes
–their politics, aesthetics and impacts. Since
memory, fantasy, history and cinema cannot escape the
effects of cultural and individual trauma, cinema
scholars must develop analytic forms appropriate to
illuminating trauma’s impacts (Kaplan, 2001, pp. 204-
205).
It would not be wrong to conclude that despite also
carrying melodramatic features, the film Beynelmilel, due
to its well-characterized tinge of irony and critique on
the narrow-mindedness of the military logic; thus the 12
September as the product of this logic and understanding,
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managed to acquire a better position in the category of
so-called 12 September films, than the film Babam ve
Oğlum, which bears the characteristics of melodrama and
tells the audience about the tragic story of two fathers
and sons in the post-12 September period. On the other
hand, Beynelmilel also tells the audience a tragic story;
the separation of two lovers with the background of,
again, post-12 September period. In the end, it would not
be wrong to emphasize that both films appear to be
victimized by critiques because of carrying melodramatic
features, which leads the audience focus on the tragic
stories rather than the reason of the tragic events,
which is in this sense, the 12 September military
takeover.
The two films Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum can be
regarded as trauma films, owing to their main themes and
the characters’ bearing features of traumatic
individuals. It is true to a certain extent that trauma
stories are told throughout the mentioned films on the
individual level, taking the 12 September event as a
background. However, this attitude and tendency is not
unique to films but, it can be observed within the
society itself, as it has been argued above.  The films
Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum, despite the critiques
pointing at the shortcomings of them, also contribute
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into the discussions of the 12 September military coup by
creating a cinematic field for analysis and observations.
The characters in both films represent good examples of
the society members on the micro level by showing how
individuals experience traumas and how these accumulate
in years and produce collective traumas, on which members
of the society prefer not to talk but just to forget and
try to burry in the past, creating a vicious circle in
itself.
Therefore, it could be argued that each opportunity of
remembering and analysis is vitally significant for the
recovery of this trauma. The culture of remembering
should be flourished and expanded. Endeavors on this way
should never be quit or retarded, because they are
necessary for the elimination of a violence culture and
for flourishing of a peaceful society in which democracy
is a fundamental element. As stressed by Sancar:
…such kind of an abandonment would at the same time
mean to resign from the goal of becoming a ‘normal’
society rescued from the government mentality that
announces itself as the titleholder for disregarding
the human and human rights when found necessary, from
grudge-lynch culture and from the threat of mass
conflicts and massacres and would mean to resign from
the struggle of democratization of the political
culture (Sancar, 2005, p. 27).
Societies that cannot face their histories, the tragic
and traumatic periods in the past in particular, are
doomed to live with that pain forever. Cinema is a medium
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that can be functionalized to create chances to come to
terms with the past. Beynelmilel and Babam ve Oğlum are
also a part of this utilization of the cinematic medium;
thus they deserve consideration.
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